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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L. C.' significantly changed the remedial landscape for patent owners, holding that
entry of a permanent injunction would not automatically follow a finding that an as-
serted patent was infringed and not invalid. As a result, a substantial number of
prevailing patentees have been denied the ability to exclude future acts of infringe-
ment through the court's contempt power for the first time.3 eBay's impact is per-
haps most acute for patent assertion entities ("PAEs")-firms that own, license, and
assert patents in litigation, but do not directly practice the patented technology-
who rarely can satisfy eBay's four-factor test for injunctive relief.
1 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
2 See id. at 393-94 (rejecting the "'general rule' articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit 'that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged"' (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005));
see also laideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v.
MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 27 (2009) ("As is now well known, eBay dramatically
changed the way federal courts decide whether to grant injunctive relief after a patent infringement
verdict, overtuming decades of Federal Circuit precedent that granted a nearly automatic right to
post-verdict injunctive relief.").
See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNfNG PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDtEs WITH COMPETITION 216 (2011) ("Surveys of post-eBay cases reveal that district courts
have granted approximately 72%--77% of permanent injunction requests."); Stephen M. Ullmer,
Paice Yourselves: A Basic Framework for Ongoing Royalty Determinations in Patent Law, 24
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 75, 76 (2009) ("Following eBay, the lower courts deny injunctive relief more
frequently and will likely compensate aggrieved patent owners with prospective liability-rule re-
lief.").
4 The precise definition of a PAE is not always clear, but commentators generally use it to refer to
patent owners who exploit their patents through licensing and/or litigation, rather than through the
development, manufacturing, and sale of products that practice the patented technology. See, e.g.,
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In eBay's wake, some patentees have turned to another form of prospective re-
lief-an ongoing royalty.6 While the Federal Circuit has authorized the award of
ongoing royalties as an equitable alternative to a permanent injunction, numerous
questions regarding such relief remain unresolved, including when ongoing royal-
ties should be awarded, the structure and methodology for computing an award, and
possible enhancement of the royalty rate for post-judgment willful infringement.8
Despite lower courts' attempts to grapple with these issues, a comprehensive meth-
odology for determining ongoing royalties has yet to emerge.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 8 n.5 ("This report uses the term 'patent assertion entity' ra-
ther than the more common 'non-practicing entity' (NPE) to refer to firms whose business model
primarily focuses on purchasing and asserting patents. Taken literally, the term NPE encompasses
patent owners that primarily seek to develop and transfer technology, such as universities and sem-
iconductor design houses. Patent assertion entities do not include this latter group."); Cotlen V.
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.L 297, 328 (2010) (explaining that PAEs "are focused on the en-
forcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their patents," and noting
that PAEs "can be firther divided into several types-large-portfolio companies, stnall-portfolio
companies, and individuals"); Robert 0. Lindefjeld, Keeping the United States on Top ofits Game,
6 LANDSLIDE 1, 62 (2014) ("The definition of what exactly is a 'patent assertion entity' has
evolved over time, but it is essentially a party that exploits the limitations of our nation's laws and
legal institutions to extract more monetary value from a patent than it is worth."); see also In re
Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1325 (2014) (per curiam) (Plager, J., concurring) ("Patent trolls are also
known by a variety of other names: 'patent assertion entities' (PAEs), [and] 'non-practicing enti-
ties' (NPEs).").
See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 tbl.l (2012) (finding that district courts granted NPEs injunctions in 26% of
total requests from May 2006 through August 2011); Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent En-
forcement After eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 235, 243 (2006) ("eBay reduced
the likelihood that patent rights will be enforced through the use of permanent injunctions, espe-
cially for patent holders who do not themselves practice the patented inventions."); see also infra
Part ]L.C,
See Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 644 (E.D. Tex, 2011) ("[l]t
is now more common for plaintiffs. , . who do not obtain an injunction in light of eBay, to move
the Court to set an ongoing royalty rate for post-judgment infringement of the adjudicated patents-
in-suit"); see also Michael C. Brandt, Note, Compulsory Licenses in the Aftermath of eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., The Courts'Authority to Impose Prospective Compensatory Relieffor Pa-
tent Infringement, 17 FED. CIR. B.J., 699, 704 (2008) ("Since the eBay decision, courts have in-
creasingly granted compulsory licenses in lieu of permanent injunctions,").
7 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Under some cir-
cumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infingement in lieu of an injunction may be
appropriate,").
See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONoMic ANALYSIS 62
(2013) ("The efay decision [] leaves open the question of how to calculate damages for prospec-
tive infringement in a case in which a court declines to award injunctive relief. .. ."); John Gold-
en, Injunctions as More (or Less) than "Off Switches": Patent-Infringement I junctions 'Scope, 90
TEx. L, REv, 1399, 1401 n.1 (2012) ("Denials of patent-infringement injunctions have raised ques-
tion of when and how a court should award an 'ongoing royalty' to compensate for expected ac-
tivity that the court does not enjoin."); Ronald J. Schulz et al., Uncharted Waters: Determining
Ongoing Royalties for Victorious Patent Holders Denied an Injunction, 11 SEDONA CON F. J, 75, 78
(2010) ("[T]he law is not clear who-the court or the jury-determines the ongoing royalty, or
how the fact-finder determines an appropriate ongoing license.").
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This Article seeks to fill this void in two ways. First, it empirically assesses
how courts have resolved claims for ongoing royalties by prevailing patentees. It
does so by reporting the results from an original dataset of district court decisions
on ongoing royalties following eBay. Second, based in part on insights from this
empirical study, it proposes a new framework for determining ongoing royalty
awards. In particular, this framework is designed to avoid over- or under-
compensation of patentees by requiring consideration of actual or anticipated
changes to the relevant product market as well as potential future alternatives to the
patented technology in determining the amount of an ongoing royalty award.
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part II discusses prospec-
tive remedies in patent law prior to the eBay decision. It also analyzes the eBay de-
cision and its impact on the availability of injunctive relief for PAEs. Part III as-
sesses ongoing royalties as an alternative to permanent injunctive relief and
evaluates several unresolved issues regarding ongoing royalty awards. Part IVde-
scribes the methodology and findings from the author's empirical study of ongoing
royalty awards following eBay. Finally, Part V proposes a new framework for
computing ongoing royalty awards in future cases.
IL Prospective Remedies in Patent Law
There are several types of prospective relief that a district court can consider in
patent cases. First, and most common from a historical perspective, it can grant a
permanent injunction prohibiting future infringement by the defendants, their agents
and employees, and others acting in concert with them.9 Second, it can allow the
parties to negotiate terms for future uses of the patented invention.10 Third, it can
order the defendant o pay for post-judgment infringing conduct (usually selling a
product or service that practices the patented invention) at a rate established by the
court, which is known as an ongoing royalty." Finally, the district court "can exer-
cise its discretion to conclude that no forward-looking relief is appropriate in the
circumstances."2 If the patentee is denied any prospective relief, it can elect to file
' See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
("From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief. . . in the vast majority
of patent cases."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (describing the required contents of an injunction
order and the persons who can be bound by it after receiving actual notice).
I0 See Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("If the district
court determines that a permanent injunction is not warranted, the district court may, and is en-
couraged, to allow the parties to negotiate a license.").
" See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1313-16 (describing ongoing royalty awards); see also ActiveVideo Net-
works v. Verizon Commc'ns, 694 F.3d 1312, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that patentee's
"loss of revenue due to [defendant]'s infringement can be adequately remedied by an ongoing roy-
alty from [defendant] for each of its subscribers" and remanding for a determination of "an appro-
priate ongoing royalty rate for future infringement").
12 Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Paice, 504
F.3d at 1314-15 ("[A]warding an ongoing royalty where 'necessary' to effectuate a remedy . ..
does not justify the provision of such relief as a matter of course whenever a permanent injunction
is not imposed.").
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new litigation seeking compensation for any additional acts of infringement that oc-
curred after entry of final judgment.13
A. Prospective Relief in Patent Cases Before eBay
As previously mentioned, a permanent injunction was the most common pro-
spective remedy for a prevailing patentee prior to eBay.14 While section 283 of the
Patent Act provides that the district court has discretionary authority to grant or de-
ny injunctive relief,5 historically permanent injunctions were the preferred remedy
and were routinely awarded "as a matter of course" upon a finding that the asserted
patent was infringed and not invalid.'6
After the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982, it followed suit and adopted a
"igeneral rule" awarding an injunction against an adjudged infringer.'7  Although
recognizing that "a district court has discretion whether to enter an injunction," it
declared that "an injunction should issue once infringement has been established un-
less there is a sufficient reason for denying it." 19 The court explained that injunc-
tions against future infringement usually should be granted because of the nature of
a patent as a property right.20 As one early Federal Circuit decision put it, "the right
to exclude recognized in a patent is . . . the essence of the concept of property."" In
13 See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d. 437, 444-45 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (declining
to award prospective monetary compensation after denying injunctive relief and ordering patentee
to file a new civil action to recover damages for post-verdict infringement); see also H. Tomas
Gomez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and Copy-
right Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1661, 1663 (2010) ("In the absence of a final injunction, many
plaintiffs would prefer the option of suing the defendant again."),
14 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (stating that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent" (emphasis added); see also Data-
scope Corp. v. Kontron Inc., 786 F.2d 398, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("By its terms, 35 U.S.C. § 283
clearly makes the issuance of an injunction discretionary." (internal quotations and citation omit-
ted),
16 See Note, The Enforcement of Rights Against Patent Infringers, 72 HARv, L. REV. 328, 342 (1958)
("Once the issues have been fully adjudicated in the plaintiffs favor, a permanent injunction is
usually granted as a matter of course."); Herbert F. Schwartz, Note, Injunctive Relief in Patent In-
fringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. Rcv. 1025, 1041-42 (1964) ("By the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, courts generally recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to . - an injunction against future
infringements for the life of the patent."); see also 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1220 (1890) ("A perpetual injunction issues, as a matter of course, at
the conclusion of a suit in equity, whenever the plaintiff has sustained the allegations of his bill,
provided the patent has not then expired.").
'7 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394-95 (2006).
'8 Trans-World Mfg. Co. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
' W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc. 842 F.2d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
20 See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is con-
trary to the laws of property, of which the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to ex-
clude others from use of his property.").
21 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting "the long-settled view that the essence
of a patent grant is the right to exclude").
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contrast, "[a] compulsory license, which may arise from a refusal to enjoin, is fun-
damentally at odds with the right of exclusion built into our patent system."22 As a
result, the Federal Circuit recognized a presumption of irreparable harm when valid-
ity and continuing infringement were established.3
Although permanent injunctions were rarely denied prior to eBay," lower fed-
eral courts did recognize several limited exceptions to this "general rule." One
well-recognized exception occurred when granting a permanent injunction would
endanger public wealth or welfare.25 For instance, in City of Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of an injunction re-
garding a patented method for treating sewage that would have required the City of
Milwaukee to close its sewage treatment plant, "leaving the entire community with-
out any means for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Mich-
igan."2  As a result, an injunction would have polluted the city's drinking water and
endangered "the health and the lives of more than half a million people."2 7 Similar-
ly, in Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the Ninth
Circuit questioned whether an injunction was appropriate for a patented process of
irradiating foods to increase vitamin D, which helped eliminate the debilitating dis-
ease commonly known as rickets.28 In that case, the patentee had refused to license
the patented process to margarine producers, at a time (during World War II) when
margarine was a staple part of the diet of the poor.2 9 The Ninth Circuit considered
whether "the effect on the public health of refusing to the users of oleomarga-
rine ... the right to have ... [margarine] irradiated by the patented process is
against the public interest."0
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1856,1863 (E.D, Pa. 1990).
23 Smith Int'l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
24 See Barry Ungar, The Paid-in-Full, Lump-Sum Damages Award: A Perversion of Georgia-Pacific,
Lucent v. Gateway and the Right to Exclude, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 205, 208 (2013) ("Until the Supreme
Court's decision in MercExchange, L.L.C v. eBay, Inc. courts routinely awarded injunctions
once a patent holder successfully proved infringement . ). The exact rate of permanent injunc-
tion grants prior to eBay is unclear, but there is widespread agreement hat injunctions were grant-
ed in the vast majority of cases. See Foley & Lardner LLP, 2007 Business Litigation Express, at
11, http://www.foley.com/files/Event/528a386c-167b-4179-9552-f5a74d8cf8a8/Presentation/
EventAttachment/5882el f2-85d9-489b-9f69-fe934bl0519b/Session6_Anatulakim.pdf (finding
that permanent injunctions were granted in 95% of cases before Bay); Robert M. Isackson, After
'eBay, ' Injunctions Decrease, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2007, at SI (reporting pre-eBay permanent in-
junction grants in 84% of patent cases).
25 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[Clourts have in
rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order to protect the public in-
terest.").
26 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934).
27 Id. For a more detailed summary of the Activated Sludge case, see Julie A Berger & Justin Brun-
ner, A Court's Dilemma: When Patents Conflict with Public Health, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 53-57
(2007).
21 146 F.2d 941, 942, 944 (9th Cir. 1944).
" Id. at 945.
30 Id The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the patent was invalid and unenforceable on other
grounds. Id. at 947-53.
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Federal courts sometimes denied injunctions on other grounds prior to eBay.
For example, the Federal Circuit denied preliminary injunctive relief on a handful of
occasions when the infringing party "has or will soon cease the allegedly infringing
activities."31 In addition, several lower courts rejected entry of a permanent injunc-
tion when the patentee did not manufacture or sell a commercial product, but none-
theless sought to exclude an infringing defendant.3 2 As the Federal Circuit ex-
plained, "[a]lthough a patentee's failure to practice an invention does not
necessarily defeat the patentee's claim of irreparable harm, [its] lack of commercial
activity ... is a significant factor in the calculus."
In cases where a permanent injunction was not granted, pre-eBay courts occa-
sionally awarded a so-called "compulsory license" to at least partially compensate
the patentee for the defendant's future infringement. For instance, in Foster v.
American Machine & Foundry Co., the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's de-
nial of a permanent injunction when the patentee, who did not manufacture a prod-
uct using the patented technology, sought to exclude a manufacturing infringer.3 4 It
approved the district court's decision to instead grant a "compulsory license with
royalties" to the patentee, reasoning that this award was fair in light of the patent-
ee's "utter failure to exploit the patent on his own."3 5 Similarly, in Shatterproof
Glass v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., the Federal Circuit upheld a "court-ordered 5%
royalty for [a] compulsory patent license for continuing operations" by the defend-
ant after denying the patentee's request for a permanent injunction.
B. The eBay Litigation and Supreme Court Decision
1. The Parties and District Court Decision
Nearly a decade after the Supreme Court's decision, "[t]he story of eBay is
well known."3 7 Plaintiff MercExchange, a failed start-up founded by the inventor of
31 Polymer Tech., Inc., v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Reebok Int'l, Inc. v.
J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's denial of a pre-
liminary injunction when the defendant had discontinued production of the allegedly infringing
product).
32 High Tech Med, Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (denying an injunction when patentee did not "make or sell [the patented product] and [did]
not license their manufacture and sale"); Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1316,
1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming denial of injunction when the infringer "manufactures a product"
but "the [patentee] does not," reasoning that "{ijn the assessment of relative equities, the court
could properly conclude that to impose irreparable hardship on the infringer by injunction, without
any concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be inequitable").
3 High Tech Med. Insrumentation, 49 F.3d at 1556.
14 492 F.2d at 1324.
35 Id.
36 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
3 Venkatesan, supra note 2, at 31.
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the patent-in-suit," asserted that eBay, Inc., infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265
("the '265 patent"), which was directed to a method and apparatus "for an electronic
market designed to facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals by estab-
lishing a central authority to promote trust among participants."39 After a five-week
trial, a jury found that the '265 patent and two other patents in the same family as
the '265 patent were valid and infringed, and it awarded MercExchange $35 million
in damages.40
MercExchange subsequently moved for entry of a permanent injunction, which
the district court denied.41 While recognizing that "the grant of injunctive relief
against the infringer is considered the norm," the district court also stated that it was
required to consider "traditional equitable principles," including "(i) whether the
plaintiff would face irreparable injury if the injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the
plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in
the public interest, and (iv) whether the balance of the hardships tips in the plain-
tiffs favor."42 After evaluating all of these factors, the district court found that
none of them weighed in favor of granting MercExchange an injunction. First, the
district court pointed to "evidence of the plaintiff s willingness to license its patents,
its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its comments to the
media as to its intent with respect to enforcement of its patent rights" in finding that
eBay had rebutted the presumption that MercExchange would suffer irreparable
harm absent an injunction.43 Second,-the district court elied on MercExchange's
practice of "licens[ing] its patents to others in the past" and "its willingness to li-
cense the patents to the defendants in this case" as evidence that it had an adequate
remedy at law." Third, it concluded that "the public interest factor equally supports
granting an injunction to protect [MereExchange]'s patent rights, and denying an
injunction to protect the public's interest in using a patented business-method that
the patent holder declines to practice."4 Finally, it concluded that he balance of
hardships favored eBay because "[a]ny harm suffered. . . by the defendants' in-
fringement of the patents can be recovered by way of damages," and entry of an in-
junction "would essentially be opening a Pandora's box of new problems," includ-
38 For a detailed and interesting description of MereExchange and its founder Mr. Thomas G. Wool-
ston, who was the sole inventor of the '265 patent, see Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors:
Case Studies ofPatent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. Louis UNIV. LiJ. 1, 23-30 (2014)
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
40 MereExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695. 698-99 (E.D. Va. 2003).
41 Id. at 710, 715. For a summary of the parties' briefing on the issue of injunctive relief at the trial
court, see Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis
of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REv, (forthcoming 2015), draft available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2570944.
42 MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d. at 711.
43 Id. at 712.
44Id. at 713.
41 Id. at 714.
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ing the possibility of future disputes around eBay's proposed design around and
contempt proceedings to enforce an injunction.4 6
2. Federal Circuit Decision
MercExchange then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the jury's
findings that the '265 patent was valid and infringed by eBay, but reversed the dis-
trict court's denial of a permanent injunction. The Federal Circuit first recounted
the "general rule ... that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
validity have been adjudged."" It then explained that the district court had failed to
"provide any persuasive reason to believe this case is sufficiently exceptional to jus-
tify the denial of a permanent injunction.'A9 In particular, the Federal Circuit criti-
cized the district court's reasoning that MercExchange's willingness to license its
patents meant that it did not suffer irreparable harm and that it had an adequate rem-
edy at law, stating that this fact "should not ... deprive [MercExchange] of the right
to an injunction which it would otherwise be entitled. Injunctions are not reserved
for patentees who intend to practice their patents, as opposed to those who choose to
license."50 It also declared that the district court's "general concern regarding busi-
ness-method patents" and "the likelihood of continuing disputes over whether the
defendants' subsequent actions would violate MereExchange's rights" were "not a
sufficient basis for denying a permanent injunction."5k
3. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the issue of permanent injunc-
tive reliefe2 and unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit.53 The Court's opinion,
delivered by Justice Thomas, is relatively short (less than five pages in the United
States Reports) and direct. After summarizing the procedural history, the Court
stated that "[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test."54 Specifically, the Court held
that the patentee must show:
46 id
4 MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reversed in part on
appeal, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
4 Id at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
' Id. at 1339.
50 In.
51 Id.
52 eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005) (writ of certiorari granted). A summary
of the amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court on this issue is available at Holte, supra note 41, at
Part 11.B.1.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
Id. at 391. Several prominent remedies scholars have persuasively argued the four-factor test ar-
ticulated in eBay was neither "traditional" nor "well-established." See Douglas Laycock, MODERN
AMERUcAN REMEDLES: CASES AND MATERIALs 426 (4th ed. 2010) (concluding that "there was no
'traditional' four-part test" for permanent injunctions); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry
E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 207-14 (2012) (explaining how the eBay decision's four-factor test "differs
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(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.55
The Court then concluded that this test "appl[ied] with equal force to disputes
arising under the Patent Act," reasoning that nothing in section 283 of the Patent
Act "indicates that Congress intended [] a departure" from basic equitable princi-
ples,56
After a short discussion of patents as property rights and the treatment of in-
junctive relief under the Copyright Act,57 the Court concluded that neither the dis-
trict court nor the Federal Circuit had "fairly applied these traditional equitable
principles in deciding [MercExchange]'s motion for a permanent injunction."" It
criticized the district court for "appear[ing] to adopt certain expansive principles
suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases," includ-
ing when the patent owner did not directly practice the invention and when it was
willing to license the patents to others, and declared that such categorical rules
"cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress."59  At the
same time, it rebuffed the Federal Circuit's attempt to establish a "'general rule'
unique to patent disputes," that a permanent injunction would issue absent "excep-
tional circumstances," explaining that its departure "in the opposite direction" was
also incompatible with the four-factor test.6 0 The Court then vacated and remanded
the case to the district court to apply "the traditional four-factor framework."'6
This unanimous opinion, however, only thinly veiled an apparent deep-seated
disagreement between the Justices regarding the circumstances under which perma-
nent injunctions should be granted in future patent cases.6 2 These diverging views
from traditional equitable practice in at least three, and possibly four, significant ways"); Doug
Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV.
LITIc. 63 n.71 (2007) (noting that "[r]emedies specialists had never heard of the four-point test" ar-
ticulated in eBay). A full analysis of the merits of the eBay decision and its treatment of the histo-
ry of permanent injunctive relief is outside the scope of this Article.
5 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
56 Id. at 392.
* Id. at 392-93.
" d. at393.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 393-94.
SI eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
See Paul M. Mersino, Note, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay Auction Away a
Patent Holder's Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV, 307, 326 (2007) ("The generality in the
(C]ourt's holding (in eBay] was compounded by the fact that, although it was technically unani-
mous, the two concurring opinions were highly divergent on exactly how the holding should be
applied."); see also James M. Fischer, The "Right" to Injunctive Relieffor Patent Infringement, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20 (2007) ("The Court's decision in eBay, although
presented as a unanimous decision . . . is sufficiently terse, pithy, and fractured by the two concur-
rences as to provide some support to practically any conclusion one wishes to draw from the deci-
sion.").
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burst to the forefront in two concurring opinions. In a two-paragraph concurrence,
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, suggested that trial
courts would be wise to consider "a page of history" and continue to grant perna-
nent injunctions in the "vast majority of patent cases" after eBay. In particular, the
Chief Justice noted the difficulty posed in protecting the right to exclude "through
monetary remedies that allov an infringer to use an invention against the patentee's
wishes,"64
In a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer, initially expressed agreement with the Chief Justice's statement that
"history may be instructive in applying [the four-factor] test," but immediately pro-
ceeded to critique the Chief Justice's assertion regarding the difficulty of protecting
the right to exclude without an injunction, contending that "[bjoth the terms of the
Patent Act and the traditional view of injunctive relief accept that he existence of a
right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a violation of that right."65 Justice
Kennedy then explained why modem patent cases often differed from historical pa-
tent litigation in several important ways, including the role of non-practicing patent-
ees who employed injunctive relief "as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent."66 He also explained that
injunctions may be inappropriate "[w]hen the patented invention is but a small
component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an in-
junction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations."7 Finally, Justice
Kennedy pointed to the "burgeoning number of patents over business methods,"
some of which suffer from "potential vagueness and suspect validity," as another
reason to potentially deny injunctive relief.6
C. eBay's Impact on PAEs
eBay's four-factor test for permanent injunctions has dramatically affected
PAEs who do not practice the patented technology.69 Empirical studies of patent
cases demonstrate that PAEs rarely are awarded permanent injunctions in patent
cases following eBay. In a recent study, Professors Colleen Chien and Mark Len-
ley found that non-practicing patentees were granted permanent injunctions in only
26% of patent cases from May 2006 (the month of the Supreme Court's eBay deci-
sion) through August 2011, and in only 7% of cases where the non-practicing pa-
63 eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
64 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
65 Id, at 395-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6 Id, (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 Id, at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69 See Venkatesan, supra note 2, at 27 ("As is now well known, eBay dramatically changed the way
federal courts decide whether to grant injunctive relief after a patent infringement verdict, over-
turning decades of Federal Circuit precedent that granted a nearly automatic right to post-verdict
injunctive relief.").
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tentees' injunction was opposed by the infringer.0 In contrast, they found that prac-
ticing patentees were awarded permanent injunctions almost 80% of the time.7' In a
separate paper reporting the results of an empirical study of all contested permanent
injunction decisions in district courts from the date of the Supreme Court's eBay
decision through the end of 2013, this author found that non-practicing entities were
granted permanent injunctions in only 16% of decisions, while operating companies
received injunctions 80% of the time.72
A review of lower court decisions after eBay shows that PAEs often fail the
first two factors of eBay's four-factor test. First, PAEs often are unable to satisfy
the "irreparable injury" requirement because courts no longer presume that a patent-
ee is irreparably harmed by ongoing patent infringement.73 Since eBay, the Federal
Circuit has "confirm[ed] that eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as
it applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief."7 4  Without this
presumption, PAEs often cannot demonstrate the type of harm that would warrant
entry of an injunction. The most common form of irreparable harm found by dis-
trict courts post-eBay is the patentee's loss of market share for a product due to the
defendant's introduction of a competing infringing product.7 5 As the Federal Cir-
cuit recently explained, "[w]here two companies are in competition against one an-
other, the patentee suffers the hanm-often irreparable-of being forced to compete
against products that incorporate and infringe its own patented inventions."76 But
PAEs do not manufacture or sell products directly, and so they cannot establish this
type of harm.
Further, a PAE's acceptance of monetary compensation in exchange for a li-
cense to practice the patented technology can demonstrate that it is unable to satisfy
eBay's second factor. As the district court in eBay explained in again denying a
70 Chien & Lemley, supra note 5, at 10 tbl. 1.
71 Id.
72 Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical
Study (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
n Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1668.
7 Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
7s Seaman, supra note 72; see also Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertain-
ties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive ReliefAfter eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J 437,
442 (2008) ("For the most part, when the parties-in-suit were deemed direct competitors, perma-
nent injunctions were issued." (emphasis omitted)).
76 Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F,3d 1306, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Lourie, J., concurring) ("[A] pa-
tent provides a right to exclude infringing competitors . . .").
" See John Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAs L. REv. 2111, 2113 (2007)
("Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in eBay, district courts appear to have consistently
denied permanent injunctions in cases where an infringer has contested the patent holder's request
for such relief and the infringer and patent holder were not competitors,"); Sarah R. Wasserman
Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 AM. U. L. REv. 733, 758 (2012) ("The market
share rule ensures that only actors who practice their patents will be entitled to injunctions. Moreo-
ver, only firms that practice in the relevant field of technology will be competitors with market
share, by definition.").
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permanent injunction after remand from the Supreme Court, a patentee's "willing-
ness to license its patent portfolio" can support a finding that the patentee has an
"adequate remedy at law."78 Thus, as one district court bluntly put it, "[b]ecause it
is an NPE [non-practicing entity], [the patentee] cannot obtain an injunction against
patent infringement from a federal court."79
The unavailability of injunctive relief significantly impacts PAEs in licensing
markets for patented inventions. Without a credible threat of a permanent injunc-
tion, PAEs' bargaining power in licensing negotiations for future uses of the patent-
ed technology is significantly diminished.a0 As the Federal Trade Commission ex-
plained in its 2011 report, The Evolving IP Marketplace, the absence of injunctive
relief for PAEs may result in a dynamic called "infringer hold-out," whereby manu-
facturing infringers "will be less willing to license and more willing to litigate if the
consequence of lost litigation is only a compulsory license and not an injunction."81
III. Ongoing Royalties After eBay
Faced with the unavailability of injunctive relief, prevailing PAEs increasingly
have turned to so-called "ongoing royalties" to provide some measure of compensa-
tion for harm caused by continuing infringement.s2 This Part will first discuss the
nature of an ongoing royalty, and then it will address several unresolved issues re-
garding ongoing royalty awards.
7 MereExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007); see also Apple
Inc. v. Samsung Elecs, Co., 735 F,3d 1352, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding "no error in the district
court's decision to consider evidence of Apple's past licensing behavior," but also finding that the
trial court could not create "a categorical rule that [a patentee]'s willingness to license its patents
precludes the issuance of an injunction").
9 Lamina Packing Innovations, LLC v. Monsieur Touton Selection, Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 5039(CM),
2013 WL 1421781, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,2013).
80 See Venkatesan, supra note 2, at 26 ("eBay also triggered a deeper change-the level of compen-
sation a patentee should expect for patents adjudicated to be valid and infringed, particularly for
'nonpracticing patentees' who do not commercialize their patents.'); see also Barton H. Thompson
Jr., Note, Injunction Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1563, 1576 (1975) (explaining that "the denial of equitable relief allows another to utilize
[the owner's] property for less than the potential bargained-for rate").
8 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 220.
82 See Lisa M. Tittemore, The Controversy Over "Ongoing Royalty" Awards in the Evolving Land-
scape of Remedies for Patent Infringement, 56 FED. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 29, 30 ("[S]ince
eBay, ongoing royalties have become far more prevalent."); see also infra Part IV.B.1 & tbl.1 (de-
scribing the increase in number of ongoing royalty awards since eBay).
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A. Ongoing Royalties as an Alternative to Permanent Injunctions
1. Ongoing Royalties vs. Compulsory Licenses
An ongoing royalty is monetary compensation paid to the patentee by the ad-
judged infringer for post-judgment infringing uses of the patented invention.
83
Some have asserted that an ongoing royalty is merely a euphemism for a compulso-
ry license.1 Strictly speaking, however, this claim is incorrect for at least three 
rea-
sons.
First, unlike compulsory licenses in other areas of intellectual property law,
such as a mechanical license for a previously-released musical work under section
115 of the Copyright Act,85 an ongoing royalty is not available to all comers; rather,
it is limited to the infringing defendant." Second, an ongoing royalty is not "com-
pulsory" for the patentee as that term is normally used. If a patentee 
is unable to
obtain permanent injunctive relief to prevent future infringement, it may elect not to
seek an ongoing royalty and instead bring a second lawsuit for monetary damages
under section 283 for infringement occurring after entry of final judgment in the ini-
tial lawsuit.87 Third, an ongoing royalty is not a "license" in terms of remedies for a
violation because, unlike a traditional licensing agreement between private parties
where breach of the agreement would give rise to a contract-based cause of action,
8
violation of an ongoing royalty order (for example, by failing to pay the ordered
royalties) would be redressable through the district court's contempt power.
89
u See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that an
"ongoing royalty" is "an order permitting [future] use of a patented invention in exchange 
for a
royalty" (emphasis omitted)).
84 See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
("'[Olngoing royalty' is merely a nice way of saying 'compulsory license."'); see also Paice, 
504
F.3d at 1316 (Rader, J., concurring) ("[C]alling a compulsory license an 'ongoing royalty' does 
not
make it any less [ofJ a compulsory license.").
17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).
See Creative Internet Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F, Supp. 2d 847, 852 n.6 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
("The term 'compulsory license' implies that anyone who meets certain criteria has congressional
authority to use that which is licensed."); Brief Arnici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors
in Support of Petitioners at 8-9, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-
130), 2006 WL 1785363, at *9 ("A compulsory license is a blanket rule that permits 
all others to
use a patent upon payment of a specified royalty, giving certainty to those who would 
infringe the
patent that they can do so upon payment of a royalty.").
87 Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MereExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent 
Reme-
dies, 9 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 543, 567 (2008); see also Paul M. Janicke, Implementing 
the "Ade-
quate Remedy at Law" for Ongoing Patent Infringement After eBay v. MercExchange, 
51 IDEA
163, 174 (2011) ("Traditionally, when an injunction was refused[,] the patent 
owner was left to
bring successive actions as and when further infringements occurred.").
88 Cf Nano-Proprietary, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., 537 F.3d 394, 399-401 (5th Cir. 2008) (evaluating an
alleged breach of a patent license agreement under contract law).
89 See G6mcz-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1673 ("[Tlhe court retains the power to hold a defendant
in contempt for failing to pay a continuing royalty." (citing Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.,
No. 05-CV-467 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2008) (order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs
motion for contempt))).
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2. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
Ongoing royalties (although not necessarily by that name) were awarded in
several district court cases shortly after the eBay decision.90 But it was not until the
Federal Circuit's 2007 decision in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.91 that an ongo-
ing royalty was firmly established as a form of prospective relief for patentees.
In that case, Paice LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, sued Toyota
Motor Company and several of its American subsidiaries in June 2004 for infring-
ing three patents that it owned related to hybrid vehicle technology.92 Called a "pa-
tent troll" by some,93 Paice was founded by Dr. Alex Severinsky, an ex-Soviet dmi-
gr6 with a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and a professor at the University of
Maryland who is a named inventor on 30 U.S. patents.9 4 Toyota manufactured and
sold the popular Prius hybrid electric vehicle in the United States starting in 2000.95
Paice alleged that starting in 2003, Toyota's Prius (as well as two other vehicles)
infringed Paice's patented technology.96 After a ten-day trial, the jury found that
two claims of one of the asserted patents were infringed and awarded over $4 mil-
lion in damages to Paice.97
After the verdict, Paice moved for entry of a permanent injunction to prevent
Toyota from making, using, offering for sale, and selling the infringing vehicles in
the United States.98 Applying eBay's four-factor test, the district court denied
Paice's request, finding that it had not proven either irreparable harm or that mone-
tary damages would be inadequate.99 In lieu of an injunction, it awarded an ongoing
90 See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept.
5, 2006), aff'd, 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., No. 1:05-CV-264,
2006 WL 2037617, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
91 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
92 Complaint at 1, 8-10, Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2.04-CV-2 I1 (E.D. Tex. June 8,
2004), 2004 WL 3358536, at *1. The asserted patents in the Paice litigation were U.S. Patent No.
5,343,970 (issued Sept. 6, 1994), U.S. Patent No. 6,209,672 (issued Apr. 3, 2001), and U.S. Patent
No. 6,554,088 (issued Apr. 29, 2003).
93 David Kiley, The Secret Company That's Profiting From Every Hybrid On The Road,
AUTOBLOG.COM (Oct. 30, 2010), http://www.autoblog.com/2010/10/30/profiting-from-hybrids
("Some might call Paice a 'patent troll,' which is a derogatory term for a company that buys patent
rights of bankrupt fins and tries to shake down companies in infringement cases.").
94 Paice, About Paice, http://www.paicehybrid.com/about (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); Alex Severin-
sky, DEP'T OF MECH. ENG'G, UNIV. OF MD., http://www.enme.umd.edu/faculty/severinsky (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2015); see also Sam Smith, The Hybrid Inventor Who Sued Toyota-And Won,
WIRED.COM (July 22, 2010), http://www.wired.com/2010/07/alex-severinsky-toyota.
9 Paice, 504 F.3d at 1299.
96Id
9 Id. at 1302.
Id.
9 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motors Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 16, 2006). The district court also concluded that the balance of the hardships weighed
against enjoining Toyota, and that the public interest favored neither party, Id, at *6.
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royalty of approximately $25 per infringing vehicle sold-the same rate as the ju-
ry's verdict for past damages. 00
Paice appealed both the denial of its motion for a permanent injunction as well
as the ongoing royalty award.'01 After affirming on the other issues raised by the
parties, the Federal Circuit considered the district court's ongoing royalty order. It
first denied Paice's claim that the district court lacked statutory authority to issue
the ongoing royalty, concluding that "[u]nder some circumstances, awarding an on-
going royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate"
under section 283.102 However, the court also cautioned that an ongoing royalty
was not necessarily justified "as a matter of course whenever a permanent injunc-
tion is not imposed."'03 It also rejected Paice's assertion that it was entitled to a jury
decision under the Seventh Amendment on the amount of an ongoing royalty, con-
cluding that an award of monetary relief "does not, standing alone, warrant a jury
trial."" Finally, the Federal Circuit vacated the royalty of $25 per vehicle, con-
cluding that "the district court's order provides no reasoning to support . .. the roy-
alty rate" and remanded "for the limited purpose of having the district court reeval-
uate the ongoing royalty rate."'0 On remand, the Federal Circuit suggested that the
district court entertain any additional evidence offered by the parties "to account for
any additional economic factors arising out of the imposition of an ongoing royal-
ty."' The court also strongly implied that the parties should be given a reasonable
opportunity to privately negotiate a royalty rate for future uses, with the district
court only setting a royalty rate if "the parties fail to come to an agreement."'0 7
In a brief concurring opinion, then-Chief Judge Rader agreed with the judg-
ment, but emphasized his position that the court "should do more than suggest that
'the district court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate amongst themselves ...
before imposing an ongoing royalty."'08 Instead, he would "require the district
court to remand this issue to the parties" to determine royalty terms on their own "or
to obtain the permission of both parties before setting the ongoing royalty rate it-
self."'" Chief Judge Rader explained his preference for a negotiated resolution by
pointing to the parties' superior knowledge regarding "market or other circumstanc-
00 Paice, 504 F.3d at 1303 (citing Paice LLC v. Toyota Motors Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1, slip op. at 2
(ED. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006)).
]01 Id.
0o Id. at 1314.
10 Id. at 1315.
14 Id at 1316.
' Id. at 1315.
1o6 Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315. On remand, the district court in fact did so, and awarded a higher $98 per
vehicle ongoing royalty rate in light of "changed legal and factual circumstances occurring since
the first hypothetical negotiation." Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630
(E.D. Tex. 2009).
t? Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315.
'0 id. at 1316 (Rader, C., concurring) (quoting id. at 1315).
' Id. (Rader, C.J., concurring).
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es that might affect the royalty rate reaching into the future."'"o Ultimately, he ar-
gued, "the parties to a license are better situated than the courts to arrive at fair and
efficient [licensing] terms."t t t
B. Unresolved Issues Regarding Ongoing Royalties
Although there has been some disagreement in the academic literature about
courts' authority to grant an ongoing royalty for future patent infringement,112 ongo-
ing royalties have been routinely granted by district courts13 and regularly con-
firmed by the Federal Circuit since Paice.14 However, a number of key issues re-
main unresolved, including when ongoing royalties should be granted, who should
determine the royalty rate, the methodology for calculating the award, the structure
of the royalty payments, and whether the royalty rate should be increased due to
post-judgment willful infringement. This section addresses each of these topics in
turn.
1. When An Ongoing Royalty Should Be Awarded
A threshold issue is under what circumstances should courts grant an ongoing
royalty. This Article contends that an ongoing royalty should be granted in nearly
all cases where an injunction has been denied and the patentee requests monetary
compensation for prospective infringement by the defendant. To do otherwise
would effectively permit infringers to engage in royalty-free uses of the patented
technology,15 which in turn would likely have a negative impact on incentives to
innovate."6 Moreover, royalty-free exploitation by an adjudicated infringer appears
110 Id. (Rader, C.J., concurring).
.. Id. (Rader, C.J., concurring).
112 Compare Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1664 ("The principal aim of this Article is to
demonstrate that federal courts have no authority to award compulsory prospective compensation,"
including a "continuing royalty . .. for "post-judgment ... patent infringement."), and Chao, supra
note 87, at 567 (suggesting that § 283 only expressly authorizes "injunctions" and "does not dis-
cuss any other kind of relief"), and Ungar, supra note 24, at 219-23 (contending that the Patent
Act provides no basis for a jury to award a license for future infringement), with Mark A. Lemley,
The Ongoing Confusion Over Ongoing Royalties, 76 Mo L REv. 695, 699 (2011) (contending that
"while the question is not free from doubt, there are reasonable arguments for treating ongoing
royalties as within either the law or the equity power of the courts").
"3 See Appendix for a list of ongoing royalty awards by district courts.
114 See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v, Baxter Int'l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Amado
v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *9 (N.D,
Cal. Nov. 25, 2014) ("While a patentee does not automatically receive ongoing royalties in lieu of
a permanent injunction ... a prevailing patentee should receive compensation for any continuing
infringement").
"6 Cf SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 178 (2004) (explaining that royalty-free
cross-licensing within a patent pool dilutes "[t]he incentive of a pool member to bear the cost of
innovation").
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inconsistent with section 284's requirement that the patentee be adequately com-
pensated for infringement.'17
However, several limited exceptions to this principle should be recognized.
First, the obligation to pay an ongoing royalty should terminate when the patent's
term expires. This comports with the rule from antitrust law prohibiting a patentee
from requiring a licensee to pay post-expiration royalties.1 8  Second, an ongoing
royalty should not be required if the infringer has voluntarily ceased its infringing
conduct and there is no reasonable prospect of resumption,'19 In such situations, the
time and cost associated with determining a royalty award would be wasted because
the defendant is unlikely to resume its infringing conduct. Third, a court might de-
cline to award an ongoing royalty-or, less dramatically, grant a royalty at a lower
rate than for past infringement-if public health or welfare would be seriously
harmed by imposing a royalty. This might occur, for instance, if the royalty would
hinder access to a lifesaving treatment for which there are no reasonable alterna-
tives.120
2. Who Determines the Royalty Rate
After determining that an ongoing royalty should be awarded, the next logical
question is who should decide the amount of the royalty. The Federal Circuit has
repeatedly held that ongoing royalties are equitable in nature and thus do not impli-
cate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.'2 ' Thus, despite some arguments
to the contrary,12 2 it seems likely that courts will continue to be involved in ongoing
"' See 35 U.S.C. § 284 ("Upon finding for the claimant[,] the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement...."); see also Telcordia Techs,, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("An award of an ongoing royalty is appropriate be-
cause the record supports the district court's finding that [patentee] has not been compensated for
[infringer]'s continuing infringement.").
"' See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
reconsider whether requiring royalty payments after a patent's expiration should be per se unlaw-
ful. Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014).
"9 See Xpert Universe, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 09-157-RGA, 2013 WL 6118447, at *14 (D. Del.
Nov. 20, 2013) (denying patentee's request for "an enhanced ongoing royalty for the life of the pa-
tents for future sales" because "[t]here are no future infringing sales on which to base a royalty").
120 Cf Colleen Chien, Cheap Dnugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 861 (2003) (noting that in devel-
oping countries, "the high price of products covered by patents can put needed technology out of
the reach of. .. consumers").
121 See Paice 504 F.3d at 1315-16 ("[T]he fact that monetary relief is at issue in this case does not,
standing alone, warrant a jury trial."); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter lat'l, Inc., 733 F.3d
1369, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("An injunction and compulsory license are both inherently prospec-
tive. While we may at times improperly use the term 'damages' as a shorthand term to encompass
the concept of the right to some prospective monetary relief, that cannot change the equitable char-
acter of that relief."); Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 515 F. App'x 882, 882 (Fed. Cir.
2012) ("An ongoing royalty is not the same as an accounting for damages.").
m See Janicke, supra note 87, at 167 ("[[]f the plaintiff elects to recover in the present case for future
wrongs, she has a right to a jury trial to set the amount."); Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 79 ("An
ongoing royalty as compensation for future infringing acts is a legal remedy."), This Article takes
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royalty determinations for the foreseeable future, absent intervention by the Su-
preme Court or the Federal Circuit sitting en banc.
However, the jury can still play a significant role in determining the amount of
an ongoing royalty. Even if the Seventh Amendment doesn't require a jury trial, the
court can submit the issue of an appropriate ongoing royalty rate to the jury for an
advisory verdict.23  In several cases in the Eastern District of Texas, Judge Ron
Clark submitted the question on a "proper future royalty rate" to the jury, noting
that its "finding on that question may be taken into account by the court and the par-
ties when arriving at a value for future damages, but would not automatically result
in an award of future damages in that amount."'24 Judge Clark reasoned that deter-
mining a forward-looking royalty rate for future patent infringement was no more
difficult for a jury to calculate than damages for other types of future harm.125 In-
deed, in many cases involving a claim for a reasonable royalty for past damages, the
parties already present evidence regarding actual and anticipated future uses of the
patented invention beyond the date of the hypothetical negotiation26; the next step
no position on the contested issue of whether the Federal Circuit's conclusion in Paice (and reaf-
firmed in subsequent decisions) that a jury trial for ongoing royalties is not required under the Scv-
enth Amendment is correct as a matter of constitutional and/or statutory interpretation.
123 See FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c)(1) ("In any action not triable of right by a jury, the court, on motion on its
own[,] may try any issue with an advisory jury ... ); Lemley, supra note 112, at 706 (contending
that "a court setting ongoing royalties should do one of two things: ask the jury in its special ver-
dict form to specify the percentage royalty rate and use that rate for an ongoing royalty, or set a
royalty rate derived from the trial testimony and the jury's lump-sum damages award").
124 See Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (E.D. Tex. 2008); see also
Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (ordering that "a separate
question on a proper future royalty rate [will] be submitted to the jury"); Michael Sadowitz, Who
Determines Post-Verdict Damage Awards ]br Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World?, THE
MTTLR BLOG (Oct. 23, 2008), http://blog.mttlr.org/2008/10/who-determines-post-verdict-
damage.html#sadowFNl6anc ("In the absence of strong objections from the parties, Judge Clark
will submit an ongoing royalty rate question to the juries in three cases pending trial." (citing Seoul
Semiconductor Co. Ltd. v. Nichia Corp., No. 9:07-cv-00273 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008); SciCo v.
Boston Scientific, 9:07-cv-0076 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008); [ovate-Health Scis. Inc. v. Bio-
Engineered Supplements & Nutrition, Inc., 9:07-cv-00046 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008)).
i2 See Ariba, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 918 ("Determining a percentage rate or royalty per item to be applied
in the future in a patent case is no more difficult than the task commonly performed by jurors in
federal and state courts, when asked to calculate loss of future earning capacity, future medical ex-
penses, future pain and suffering, or future lost profits.").
126 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc-, 580 F.3d 1301, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009):
[E]vidence of usage after infringement started can, under appropriate circumstanc-
es, be helpful to the jury and the court in assessing whether a royalty is reasona-
ble . . .. Even though parties to a license negotiation will usually not have precise
data about future usage, they often have rough estimates as to the expected fre-
quency of use. This quantitative information, assuming it meets admissibility re-
quirements, ought to be given its proper weight, as determined by the circurnstanc-
es of each case.
See also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL, PROP.
LJ. 1, 41 (2001) ("[C]ourts sometimes take into account events that have occurred after the in-
fringement . . .despite the fact that this success may have been unanticipated at the time of the hy-
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of asking a jury to also calculate a forward-looking royalty does not seem beyond a
jury's capabilities.'2 7 In terms of timing, asking the jury determining damages for
past infringement to also consider future damages is preferable to empaneling a
second jury after an injunction is denied; the second jury will be unfamiliar with the
facts of the case, so getting it up to speed may result in further delay and additional
litigation-related expenses for the parties.28
In addition, a jury may decide prospective compensation as part of a paid-in-
full, "lump sum" award for the life of the patent, which covers both past and future
uses of the patented technology.29 The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial at-
taches to claims for damages for past infringement. 0 If a jury awards a lump sum
without specifying whether it was limited solely to past infringement, the district
court may treat the lump sum as also encompassing all future uses.i"' As a result, a
patentee requesting a lump sum damages award must make clear in the jury instruc-
tions and verdict form that it is seeking a single payment only for retrospective
harm; otherwise, it may forfeit any claim for a post-judgment ongoing royalty.132
In many cases, if a permanent injunction is denied, district courts will permit-
and sometimes require-litigants to negotiate regarding the amount of an ongoing
pothetical negotiations,"); John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation
and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 801
(2013) ("In actual patent litigations, ex post facts are routinely considered despite frequent asser-
tions that only information available at the point of hypothetical negotiation is to be considered.").
2 See Ariba, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (rejecting the patentee's claim that requiring a lay jury to deter-
mine an ongoing royalty would result in confusion).
128 See Lemley, supra note 112, at 700 ("By the time the judge rules on whether the patentee is enti-
tied to an injunction, it is too late to send the ongoing royalties question back to the same jury.
Judges may be reluctant to convene a second jury just to decide the ongoing royalty question.").
Professor Lemley also notes that the reexamination clause of the Seventh Amendment might also
make submitting the issue of an ongoing royalty to a second jury problematic, Id. at 705,
129 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Monsanto Co., No. C 04-0634 PJH, 2005 WL 3454107,
at *26-28 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2005) ("As a review of the case law makes clear, . . . a fully paid up
royalty spanning the life of the patent is an allowable form of damages." (citations omitted)).
so See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996) ("[T]here is no dispute that
infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centu-
ries ago."); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1204 (E.D. Cal.
2011) ("The Seventh Amendment right to jury trial applies in patent infringement actions for dam-
ages.").
131 See Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 9:09CVlll, 2011 WL 3269330, at *13 (F.D. Tex.
July 29, 2011) (holding that a "lump sum award giving [the infringer] a fully paid up license to the
patents-in-suit" had the effect of "covering all past and future use of the patented technology").
132 See id, at *5-13 (finding that a lump sum award for "all past and future sales" in the verdict form
represents a "fully paid up license" for the patented technology); see also Lighting Ballast Control,
LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 814 F. Supp. 2d 665, 693 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (holding that an
"ambiguous damages verdict of '3,000,000.00' should be construed to represent a lump-sum royal-
ty payment, which would grant [defendant] a license to the tpatent-in-suit] . . . through the expira-
tion of the patent"), revd on other grounds, 498 F. App'x 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013), panel decision re-
instated, 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015).
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royalty before the court will impose one.3 3 As explained by Judge Rader in Paice,
because licenses for future use "are driven largely by business objectives, the parties
to a license are better situated than the courts to arrive at fair and efficient terms."34
In addition, the litigants often have superior information regarding technological
and market conditions than a generalist court. '3  However, if an ongoing royalty is
demanded after a permanent injunction has been denied, the main incentive for the
infringer to agree to a royalty-the threat of being prevented from using the patent-
ed technology under court order-has been removed.'36 Thus, it is not surprising to
learn, as discussed in more detail below, that court-ordered negotiations regarding
an ongoing royalty rate are rarely successful.'
3. The Structure of the Ongoing Royalty Award
Another key issue is the structure of an ongoing royalty award. There is no
rule requiring that the structure of an ongoing royalty for future infringement be the
same as that used for past infringement.'38 In other words, a lump sum could be
awarded for past damages, while a per-unit running royalty could be used for pro-
spective relief. The three main options for structuring prospective monetary relief in
patent cases-a lump sum license, a per-unit royalty based on a fixed dollar amount,
and a per-unit royalty based on a percentage of the sales price of the infringing
productu'3 -are each discussed below.
a. Lump Sum License
The first option, a paid-in-full lump sum license, has already been men-
tioned."O A lump sum license is the simplest form of compensation; a single pay-
" See, e.g., Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 612 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming dis-
trict court order granting an ongoing royalty and directing that parties negotiate regarding the
amount of the royalty); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 986 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (ordering parties to engage in negotiation for ongoing royalty, despite the patentee's ob-
jections); Ricoh Co. v, Quanta Comp. Inc., No, 06-CV-462-BBC, 2010 WL 1607908, at *4 (W.D.
Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (ordering the litigants to negotiate regarding a license for an ongoing royalty).
134 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, C.J., concurring).
13 See COTTER, supra note 8, at 55 (contending that "all other things being equal[,] the potential par-
ties to a license do indeed have an information advantage" compared to a court).
136 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
1 See infra Part IV.B.5.
1 See Svetla K. Tzenova, The Structure of Ongoing Royalties in Parent Litigation, LAw360.COM
(Oct. 11, 2011, 12:39 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/275573/the-structure-of-ongoing-
royalties-in-patent-litigation ("{T]he structure of an ongoing royalty . .. can differ from the struc-
ture of the reasonable royalty for past infringement.").
139 Other potential alternative royalty structures include a hybrid royalty that is partially lump sum and
partially a per-unit royalty, a per-unit royalty rate that varies depending on the number of uses
and/or units sold, a per-unit royalty rate that varies over time, and a per-unit royalty with a mini-
mum payment. See Golden, supra note 77, at 2151 n.151 (describing several of these alternatives);
Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory License; Facilitating License Negotiation for Efficient
Post-Verdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP, L,. 427, 428 (2008) (arguing in favor of
a "royalty rate[] that increase[s] with time according to a schedule set by the court").
140 See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
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ment covers all past and future uses of the patented technology for the duration of
the patent term. 141 Courts have repeatedly authorized lump sum awards in patent
cases.4 2 For instance, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal
Circuit discussed in depth the option of entering into an "upfront, paid-in-full royal-
ty" in evaluating potential structures for a reasonable royalty to compensate for past
infringement.14 1
One advantage of a lump sum license is that it avoids the difficulties associated
with determining and making regular royalty payments for future sales of the in-
fringing product. Although a lump sum requires the parties to make some estimate
regarding the level of future infringement,14 4 once a flat rate is agreed upon, a single
dollar figure resolves all claims between the parties. As a result, "lump sum pay-
ments can be quickly and easily administered" without creating "an ongoing con-
tractual relationship between the parties."1 45 It also gives both sides certainty re-
garding the total amount of compensation4 6 and avoids potential disputes over
accounting for royalty payments.147 Finally, a lump sum license can be an effective
way for a patent holder "to raise a substantial amount of cash quickly,"1 4 8 which can
then be invested into new research or used to finance other business activities.
However, there are also substantial downsides to a lump sum license. Many of
the risks regarding the extent of future use of the patented technology are borne by
141 See G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1674 ("As another alternative to a final injunction, a court
might award the plaintiff a single lump sum for all future infringements for the life (or a shorter
term) of the patent, . . .").
142 See, e.g., Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (upholding award of actual damages in the form of a lump sum payment); Open Text S.A. v.
Box, Inc., No. 13-cv-0491(1-JD, 2015 WL 466815, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2015) ("[T]here is no
doubt that a fully paid-up lump sum is an allowable form of damages."); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal, v. Monsanto Co., No. C 04-0634 PJH, 2005 WL 3454107, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2005)
("As a review of the case law makes clear . . a fully paid up royalty spanning the life of the patent
is an allowable form of damages.").
143 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
144 Id. ("Parties agreeing to a lump-sum royalty agreement may, during the license negotiation, con-
sider the expected or estimated usage . . . of a given invention . . . because the more frequently
most inventions are used, the more valuable they generally are and therefore the larger the lump-
sum payment."); Lemley, supra note 112, at 701 ("A lump sum royalty award for future infringe-
ment, ... [r]equires a prediction of how many infringing products will be sold in the remaining
life of the patent, the price at which they will be sold, and the percentage of that price the patentee
would be willing to pay.").
145 Ullmer, supra note 3, at 93.
146 G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1675 (explaining that with a lump sum license, "[t]he precise
dollar amount of the award for all future infringements is determined once and for all at the time of
judgment").
14? See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326 ("A lump-sum license removes any risk that the licensee using the
patented invention will underreport, e.g., engage in false reporting, and therefore underpay, as can
occur with a running royalty agreement."); Ullmer, supra note 3, at 92 n. 110 ("[O]ngoing royalties
may require a court to step in and adjudicate disputes over the payment or accounting procedures
prescribed by the royalty agreement.").
See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326.
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the patentee.i14 As one author has explained, "[a] lump-sum payment. . . allows no
flexibility with respect to the post-trial uncertainty about the profitability of the in-
fringer's product ... or of the patent itself.,"' 5 0 For example, if a licensed product
turns out to be substantially more popular than anticipated, the additional profit
from these sales will accrue entirely to the infringer. Similarly, "[t]he licensed
technology may be wildly successful, and the licensee may have acquired the tech-
nology for far less than what later proved to be its economic value."'5' The licens-
ing infringer also bears some risks with a lump sum license as well. For instance, if
the patented invention is rendered obsolete by new technology, then the licensee has
lost much of the value of the lump sum license.52 "Thus, as with any other judg-
ment that awards lump-sum future damages, we may eventually learn that the
amount awarded overcompensated or undercompensated the plaintiff."L 53
b. Per-Unit Royalty: Fixed Dollar Amount
A second option is an ongoing royalty based on a fixed amount (typically in
American currency) per unit sold until the patent expires. The primary advantage of
this alternative is that it reduces the possibility that either the patentee or the in-
fringer will be dramatically overcompensated or undercompensated based on unan-
ticipated post-judgment developments.5 4 For example, if the patented technology
becomes wildly popular, then the licensee will share in the unexpected benefits
through increased royalty payments for each unit sold. Likewise, if the technology
is not adopted by the market, then the infringer will pay a relatively small amount
compared to the cost of a lump sum.
A per-unit royalty has several potential downsides as well. For one, a per-unit
royalty requires the licensee-infringer to track sales of product(s) that practice the
patented technology and report them on a regular basis (e.g., annually, quarterly, or
monthly) to the patentee, which imposes "ongoing administrative burdens." 5
Moreover, from the patentee's perspective, there may be a "risk that the licensee us-
ing the patented invention will underreport," either inadvertently or deliberately,
"and therefore underpay" the patentee.56
149 See Lemley, supra note 112, at 701 ("[A] forward-looking lump-sum award is unlikely to accurate-
ly capture the future injury to the patentee.").
I5o Tzenova, supra note 138.
'5' Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326,
in See id ("A further, important consideration is that an upfront, paid-in-full royalty removes . . . the
ability to reevaluate the usefulness, and thus the value, of the patented technology as it is used
and/or sold by the licensee.").
Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1675.
'is See Lemley, supra note 112, at 702 ("A per-unit dollar royalty is somewhat better [than a lump
sum], because a court does not need to accurately estimate how many products the defendant will
sell; the defendant simply pays a dollar amount each quarter based on what it actually did sell.").
s Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326. These burdens would apply equally to a per-unit royalty based on a per-
centage of the sales price, which is described in more detail in the following subsection.
56Id
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In addition, a per-unit royalty based on a fixed amount "is vulnerable to chang-
es over time in the price or value of the product."'57 For example, a licensed prod-
uct's price may decrease over time in response to competition from the entrance of
new, noninfringing competitors into the market, or due to subsequently-developed
alternatives to the patented technology, which would compel the licensee-infringer
to reduce its price (e.g., from $10 per unit to $5 per unit) or risk losing customers.5 8
If the amount of the royalty remains constant (e.g., $1 per unit sold), then the effec-
tive royalty rate would increase (e.g., from 10% to 20% of the unit's sale price).5 9
Conversely, inflation may erode the value of a fixed price royalty over time unless
the price is adjusted to compensate.160
c. Per-Unit Royalty: Percentage of Sales Price
The third alternative is a per-unit ongoing royalty calculated as a percentage of
the licensed product's sales price. This has many of the same benefits as a per-unit
fixed amount royalty, but it avoids the disadvantages associated with changes to the
licensed product's price! 6' However, it is not flawless.
One potential difficulty with a per-unit royalty based on a percentage is the
perception that a very high (e.g., greater than 10%-15%) or very low (e.g., less than
0.1%) percentage royalty rate is unfair, even if it is economically justified because
the value of the patented technology is very large or small, respectively, compared
to the price of the product that incorporates the patented technology.6 2 For exam-
ple, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit held that patentee
should not have been permitted under the entire market value rule to compare the
accused infringer's proposed licensing fee with the total amount of sales of the rele-
vant product, which the patentee claimed would result in a 0.00003% royalty.' A
second, related issue is what product constitutes the proper royalty base for purpos-
es of determining a percentage royalty. A percentage ongoing royalty may appear
'5 Lemley, supra note 112, at 701.
5 See IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 702 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("If a product is priced
higher than similar competing products, rational cost-minimizing consumers will shift to the low-
er-priced similar products ... if, instead, there are no similar or acceptable alternatives (as occurs
in a monopolized market or where patent protection bars the introduction of competitive alterna-
tives), consumers will bear the increased price for the preferred product because there are no satis-
factory alternatives to which demand can be shifted."); see also Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsid-
ering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REv.
1661, 1711-15 (discussing the role of noninfringing alternatives in constraining royalty rates in the
context of a hypothetical negotiation).
See also Lemley, supra note 112, at 701 (describing other potential changes in effective royalty
rates for fixed price royalties).
160 See CARYN R. LELAND, LICENSING ART & DESIGN 42 (rev. ed. 1995) ("Because a fixed rate formula
will not match the rate of inflation over the term of the license, a percentage rate would be more
favorable to the licensor....").
161 See Lemley, supra note 112, at 701 (contending that "[t]he best option is an ongoing percentage
royalty, which obviates the need to predict either the quantity sold or the price").
162 See Tzenova, supra note 138.
' 632 F.3d 1292, 1318-21 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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superficially more palatable if it is calculated as a low percentage of the largest
saleable unit (e.g., a computer server) rather than a higher percentage of a smaller
component that embodies the patented invention (e.g., a computer chip).5 Despite
these limitations, however, a per-unit royalty calculated as a percentage of the sales
price of a licensed product is generally the optimal structure of an ongoing royal-
4. The Methodology for Determining an Ongoing Royalty
If the parties are unable to agree on an ongoing royalty rate, then the decision
maker must select an appropriate royalty rate. The methodology used to calculate
this rate is one of the most important parts of an ongoing royalty determination.
However, the Federal Circuit has not provided clear guidance on this important is-
sue. 166
In the absence of an established framework, many district courts have elected
to apply some or all of the Georgia-Pacific factors for determining a reasonable
royalty for past infringement to guide their decision regarding prospective royal-
ties.' The Georgia-Pacific test, developed over forty years ago by a district
court'68 and subsequently adopted by the Federal Circuit,'69 identifies fifteen nonex-
clusive factors to be considered in the context of a so-called "hypothetical negotia-
tion" between the patentee and the accused infringer.70 The Georgia-Pacific fac-
16 Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287-90 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
165 See Lemley, supra note 112, at 701.
166 See Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei Innolux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645 (E.D. Tex. 2011)
("[T]he Federal Circuit has not announced a particular standard to be used in calculating an ongo-
ing royalty rate."); see also Lemley, supra note 112, at 703 ("Neither [Paice nor Arnado] set a rule
for how ongoing royalties were to be calculated...."); Schulz et al., supra note 8, at 81 ("The
Federal Circuit has not provided any specific guidance as to how an ongoing royalty should be de-
cided.").
16? See, e.g,, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2014) ("Courts have used the Georgia-Pacific factors to evaluate a post-
verdict hypothetical negotiation for ongoing royalties."); Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., No. 2:12-
CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL 2980740, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2014) ("[C]ourts have often used
the so-called Georgia-Pacific factors in assessing . . . a royalty rate in a hypothetical post-verdict
licensing negotiation"); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. CIV.A. 09-290,
2014 WL 1320154, at *37 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) ("[T]he Court weighs the traditional Geor-
gia-Pacific factors to arrive at a reasonable royalty which is adequate to compensate the patentee
for the continued infringement"); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (E.D.
Tex. 2009) ("Many of the factors noted by the Georgia-Pacific ourt are also seemingly applicable
to an ongoing royalty rate analysis.").
168 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd in
part, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
169 See, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
"[a] comprehensive list of relevant factors in determining a reasonable royalty is set out in Geor-
gia-Pacic"); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (af-
firming reasonable royalty award based on trial court's application of Georgia-Pacific).
178 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir 2009); see also Rite-Hite
Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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tors "involve a wide variety of technical, financial, licensing, and other issues."' 7
However, the Georgia-Pacific test has been repeatedly criticized as being overly
flexible, providing no real methodology for both jurors and courts to apply, and as
likely to result in the overcompensation of patentees.172
Other district courts have applied the Read factors for determining enhanced
damages for willful patent infringement to assess whether a post-judgment royalty
rate should be increased from the pre-judgment rate.173 And yet others have applied
arbitrary rules like the so-called "25% rule of thumb"1 7 4 or have increased or de-
creased proposed royalty rates without clear explanation.'75 Part V of this Article
proposes a new framework to help guide courts' and juries' determination of ongo-
ing royalty awards.'76
171 Seaman, supra note 158, at 1666.
n See, e.g., Daralyn J. Duric & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 627, 644 (2010) ("Reasonable royalty damage awards are a
mess. Damage awards, rationales, and percentages are widely disparate, reflecting an uncertain le-
gal environment and very little oversight of jury fact-finding."); Jarosz & Chapman, supra note
126, at 810 ("[T]he use of a hypothetical negotiation construct to calculate such damages has con-
tributed to a lack of certainty and predictability."); Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incen-
tives to Innovation in the New Economy qf Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
307, 373 (2006) (asserting that "the Georgia-Pacific factors and the hypothetical negotiation con-
struct fail to provide sufficient guidance" in determining a reasonable royalty); Brian J. Love, The
Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infrtingement Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. REV. 909,
910-11 (2009) ("This Article documents the striking fact that courts have time and again awarded
reasonable royalty damages for patent infringement that rise well above any objectively 'reasona-
ble' level for the apparent purpose of punishing defendants for their infringing conduct."); John W.
Schlicher, Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better Alternatives for the Courts and
Congress, 91 J. PAT, & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 19, 22 (2009) (contending that "reasonable royalty
damage awards frequently exceed the economic value of patented inventions" and that "juries are
not given useful guidance on how to apply the so-called Georgia-Pacfic factors"); Seaman, supra
note 158, at 1661, 1666-67 (arguing that Georgia-Pacific "has become increasingly difficult for
juries to apply in lengthy and complex patent trials, resulting in unpredictable damage awards" and
that "there is a growing body of evidence that Georgia-Pacific has resulted in the systematic over-
compensation of patent owners in certain industries").
1n See Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 6:09-CV-203, 2013 WL 1136964, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 15, 2013).
174 The 25% rule of thumb "is a tool that has been used to approximate the reasonable royalty rate that
the manufacturer of a patented product would be willing to offer to pay to the patentee during a
hypothetical negotiation." Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (citing Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz & Carla Mulhern, Use Of The 25 Per Cent Rule in
Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123, 123 (Dec. 2002)). In Uniloc v. Microsof, the Federal Circuit
held that the "25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline
royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation" and rejected its application. Id. at 1315-17.
175 See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630-31 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (applying the
"25% Rule of Thumb to Toyota's profit margin of 9%, thereby yielding a royalty rate of 2.25%,"
and then reducing it by 1/3 for a final royalty rate of 1.5%); see also Amado v. Microsoft Corp.517
F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating a district court award for ongoing royalties at triple
the rate for past infringement without inquiring into the possibility of changed circumstances and
whether the ongoing royalty rate was reasonable as a result).
m See infra Part V.
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5. Enhancement of Ongoing Royalties for Post-Judgment
Willfulness
A related issue is whether the ongoing royalty rate should be increased relative
to the royalty rate for past damages due to the defendant's post-judgment willful in-
fringement. Many courts conclude that any continuing infringement by the defend-
ant after the jury's verdict is automatically willful and thus routinely enhance the
post-judgment royalty rate.77 In contrast, some other courts have reasoned that an
adjudication of infringement should not necessarily lead to a higher ongoing royalty
rate because it merely confirms the parties' assumptions in the hypothetical negotia-
tion that the patent-in-suit is both valid and infringed in determining a retrospective
royalty rate."' Similarly, some intellectual property scholars contend that district
courts should not increase post-verdict royalty damages simply because the defend-
ant has exercised its ability under the ongoing royalty award to exploit the patented
technology in return for continuing royalty payments.79
For reasons explained in more detail in Part V, this Article contends that post-
judgment uses of the patented technology should not be considered "willful" if they
occur pursuant to an ongoing royalty, and therefore any increase in the ongoing
royalty rate (as compared to damages for past infringement) must be justified by
other market and/or technological reasons.
IV. An Empirical Assessment of Ongoing Royalties Since eBay
In light of these unresolved issues, as well as to obtain an understanding of
how district courts award ongoing royalties after eBay, the author undertook an em-
pirical assessment of district court decisions regarding ongoing royalties. The ob-
177 See, e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BWM N. Am., LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (E.D. Tex,
2011) ("Following a jury verdict and entry ofjudgment of infringement and no invalidity, a de-
fendant's continued infringement will he willful absent very unusual circumstances,"); I/P Engine,
Inc. v. AOL, Inc.. No. 2:11 cv512, 2014 WL 309245, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan.28, 2014) (finding post-
judgment infringement willful and increasing the ongoing royalty rate compared to the jury's ver-
diet).
1 See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, Ltd., No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at
*38 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) (finding that a hypothetical negotiation that the patentee would be
"largely satisfied with the exceptional returns on its minimal financial investments in the[] patents"
and denying patentee's claim for enhanced damages); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys.,
Inc., No. 08cv1307, 2012 WL 1436569, at * 1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 561 F. App'x 934 (Fed. Cir- Apr. 10, 2014) (explaining that the jury was "in-
structed to assume . . . that [patent-in-suit] was valid and was being infringed" and finding that "no
changed circumstances exist which would warrant a higher ongoing royalty [rate] than that set by
the jury"); see also Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (rea-
soning that "it is logically inconsistent to argue that a [royalty] calculation based upon assumptions
of infringement and validity would change when those assumptions are replaced by jury findings
of the same facts").
'7 See Lemley, supra note 112, at 702 ("If a court has decided that the defendant should be allowed to
continue to sell the infringing product because enjoining its sale imposes too great a hardship on
either the defendant or the public, it seems odd to then punish the defendant for doing the very
thing the court just permitted.").
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jectives, methodology, and findings from this study are discussed in the remainder
of this Part.
A. Study Objectives and Methodology
This empirical study of ongoing royalty awards evolved out of a larger re-
search project conducted by the author regarding permanent injunctive relief fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision in eBay. For that project, data was collected
on all available post-eBay permanent injunctions decisions by district courts from
the date of the eBay decision through the end of 2013180 One frequently-
encountered issue in these cases was whether monetary damages for ongoing in-
fringement constituted an adequate remedy at law, which would preclude entry of
an injunction.'8' In some situations, district courts determined that the relief pro-
vided by of an ongoing royalty obviated the need for a permanent injunction.8 2
To better assess how district court courts were deciding ongoing royalty
awards since eBay, the author created an original data set of ongoing royalty deci-
sions from the date of the Supreme Court's eBay decision through January 2015.
The starting point was the author's list of cases where a permanent injunction had
been denied since eBay.183  Additional ongoing royalty decisions were identified
through searches conducted in several databases, including WestlawNext 84 and Lex
Machina,85 as well the Annotated Patent Digest, which contained an extensive dis-
1so See Seaman, supra note 72.
181 See, e.g., VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816,. 846 (E.D. Tex, 2013), af'd in part, va-
cated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting patentee's request for a permanent injunction because it "has not
demonstrated that... monetary damages are an insufficient remedy"); MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582 (E.D. Va. 2007) (after remand in eBay, finding that "damages
at law constitute an adequate remedy for eBay's willful infringement" and rejecting patentee Mer-
cExchange's request for a permanent injunction); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp.
2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting patentee's claim that "monetary damages for future in-
fringement are not an adequate remedy because they cannot compensate [patentee] for the loss of
its right to exclude [the infringer]" and denying a permanent injunction); see also Janicke, supra
note 87, at 164 ("In the wake of the eBay decision, the district courts refusing permanent injunc-
tions against ongoing infringement have in every instance first found that an adequate damages
remedy at law was indeed available.").
See, e.g., Creative Internet Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
(finding "that an ongoing royalty is necessary-in lieu of injunctive relief-to adequately remedy
future infringement"); cf Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL
1049067, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2014) (in trade secret litigation, finding that "monetary relief in
the form of an ongoing royalty will provide full compensation for any future injury" and denying
entry of an injunction).
183 See Seaman, supra note 72.
184 The following search was performed in the ALLFEDS database (which contains all federal cases)
in WestlawNext: (paice or amado or creative or activevideo) /250 ("ongoing royalty" or (compul-
sor! /4 license) or (post-judg! /4 royalty!)) /250 patent.
1LEX MACHINA, https://lexnachina.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). The search term "ongoing roy-
alty" was used in this database, then the results were filtered by limiting "Case Types" to "Patent."
2015] Ongoing Royalties After eBay 231
cussion of ongoing royalty opinions by the Federal Circuit and district courts. 6
Furthermore, since many of the leading ongoing royalty decisions came from cases
originally filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
the author searched the Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice Blog by at-
torney Michael C. Smith, which has extensive news and commentary on patent cas-
es from that court.187
From these sources, fifty-seven district court decisions regarding ongoing roy-
alties were identified.'88 A complete list of these decisions is included in the Ap-
pendix. Each case was then hand coded for a variety of criteria using a standardized
set of coding instructions " This included information about the parties to the
case;ro information about the ongoing royalty decision, including citation infor-
mation, the district court where the case was pending, the date of the decision;9 1
and who made the decision (judge or jury) regarding the amount of the ongoing
royalty.9 2 Information about he patented technology,93 the structure of the ongo-
in 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 30:90.100 (2015) (case examples set-
ting amount of ongoing royalty).
1.. Michael C. Smith et al., EDTEXWEBLOG.COM, http://mcsmith.blogs.comleastern-district_of texas
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015). Google's Advanced Search feature was used to search this site for the
words "ongoing royalty." https://www.google.com/searchas_q=ongoing+royalty&asepq=&as
oq=&as eq=&asnlo=&asnhi=&lr-&cr-&as qdr=all&as sitesearch=http%3A%2F%2Fmcsmit
h.blogs.com%2Feastemdistrict of texas%2F&asocct-any&safe-images&tbs=&as_filetype=&a
s rights=&gws_rd=ssl.
1 Fifty-six of these were patent cases and one was a trade secret case. The trade secret case, Bianco
v. Globus Medical, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014 WL 2980740 (E.D. Tex. July 2, 2014),
was included in the data set because it involved a medical device, which is often protected under
patent law, and it presented many of the same issues as an ongoing royalty in patent cases. Id In
addition, it is extensively cited and relied on prior ongoing royalty decisions from patent cases. Id.
189 In empirical research, written coding instructions are desirable because they help promote con-
sistency in coding and serve as "a check against looking, consciously or not, for confirmation of
predetermined positions." Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis ofJudi-
cial Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 81 (2008); see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Var-
iables, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed.,
2005) (explaining that "the overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment-to
leave as little as possible to interpretation").
190 String variables were used for the name of the plaintiff [PLAINTIFF] and the defendant
[DEFENDANT] in the case. If multiple plaintiffs and/or defendants existed, then only the first-
named party was used. The identity of the patent owner-for instance, whether it was a PAE-
also was classified as a separate variable [PATENTEE], as explained in more detail below. See in-
fra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
191 These variables included the docket number for the case [DOCKET], citation to the ongoing royal-
ty decision in Westlaw or the electronic court docket in ECF/PACER [CITE], and the date of the
ongoing royalty decision [DATE].
192 This was a binary variable [JURY] based on whether the jury or judge made the decision regarding
an ongoing royalty.
'9 This variable [TECH] was broken down into 9 different fields of technology: computer software,
electronics, electrical, mechanical, chemistry, biotechnology, drugs, medical devices, and other.
See Seaman, supra note 72.
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ing royalty award,94 and the rate of post-judgment ongoing royalties compared to
the effective royalty for past infringement.'" All data analysis was conducted using
Stata/IC 13.1.
It is also important to note several limitations of this study. First, it involves a
relatively small number of decisions: fifty-seven cases involving fifty-four separate
ongoing royalty awards (excluding settlements).'" As a result of this small size,
traditional statistical tools for hypothesis testing, such as chi-squared tests and re-
gression analysis, could not be employed.
Second, the ongoing royalty decisions studied are subject to the selection effect
and thus may not be representative of the broader set of disputes where a patentee
might seek a forward-looking royalty. "In general, '[t]he selection effect refers to
the proposition that the selection of tried cases is not a random sample of the mass
of underlying cases.""9 7 This is because "[c]ases only go to trial when the parties
substantially disagree on the predicted outcome."'98  Rational parties consider all
available information regarding their likelihood of success on a claim, including the
applicable legal precedent, and adjust their expectations and strategy accordingly.'99
Thus, when the applicable legal standard clearly favors one side or the other, parties
tend to settle their disputes rather than incur the expense of litigation.2 00 In contrast,
"[d]ifficult cases falling close to the applicable legal standard tend not to settle, be-
cause the parties are more likely to disagree substantially in their predicted out-
comes."201 As a result, "the disputes selected for litigation . .. will constitute nei-
ther a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes."20 2 Here, the
court decisions studied are not representative of all patent disputes because all of the
following must have (or have not) occurred: (1) a patent infringement lawsuit was
filed and litigated to judgment; (2) at least one patent-in-suit was found to be in-
fringed and not invalid; (3) the district court either declined to enter a permanent in-
194 This variable [TYPE] included the three major types of royalty structures previously discussed: (1)
paid-in-full lump sum awards, (2) per-unit royalties based on a fixed price, and (3) per-unit royal-
ties based on a percentage of the sales price. See supra Part 111.B.3. It also included other royalty
structures as an additional option.
'9 This variable [RATIO] was expressed as a single numeric figure following this formula: post-
judgment royalty rate / pre-judgment royalty rate.
9 Some decisions contained multiple ongoing royalty awards for different products. If the royalty
rate varied for different products, then each product was coded as a separate ongoing royalty
award.
197 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L, REv. 1124, 1129 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Theodore Eisenberg, Testing
the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337,
337 (1990)). For the seminal article on the "selection effect," see George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
* Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 1129.
'9 Priest & Klein, supra note 197, at 4.
20) Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 197, at 1129.
201 Id.
202 Priest & Klein, supra note 197, at 4.
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junction or the patentee did not request a permanent injunction; and (4) the parties
were unable to resolve the issue of a prospective license among themselves.
Finally, some ongoing royalty decisions from the relevant time period may be
missing from the data set; thousands of patent cases are filed each year,20 3 and it is
possible that some ongoing royalty decisions were not identified despite extensive
searches in multiple databases.
B. Findings
This section presents some of the more noteworthy findings from an analysis
of the ongoing royalty decisions previously identified. It first discusses the fre-
quency of ongoing royalty awards, the districts where ongoing royalties are most
commonly granted, and the patented technology involved. It then delves more
deeply into the structure and amount of ongoing royalty awards, including differ-
ences between pre-judgment and post-judgment royalty rates by district and by field
of technology.
1. Ongoing Royalty Awards: By Year
The number of ongoing royalty awards granted each year has been increasing
since the eBay decision, as depicted in Table I below. In particular, since the Fed-
eral Circuit decision in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motors Corp. in 2007, the number of
ongoing royalty awards per year has more than tripled, from three awards the year
before Paice (2006) to ten awards in 2014, the most recent year studied.
Table 1:












* = partial year (eBay decided 5/15/06)
203 Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts. 1994 to 2014, at 17 & fig.4 (un-
published paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-2570803.
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2. Ongoing Royalty Awards: By District
Another notable finding is that ongoing royalties are highly concentrated geo-
graphically, with four district courts-the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern
District of California, the Eastern District of Virginia, and the District of Dela-
ware-granting a majority of the ongoing royalty awards in patent cases (out of 94
total U.S. district courts). In particular, as depicted in Table 2 below, the Eastern
District of Texas alone awarded 40% of all ongoing royalty awards. The remaining
90 district courts awarded only 35% of ongoing royalties, with no single district
awarding more than four.
Table 2:
Ongoing Royalty Awards, by District
District % of Awards N
Eastern District of Texas 40% 23
Northern District of California 9% 5
Eastern District of Virginia 9% 5
District of Delaware 7% 4
All Other Districts 35% 20
This finding is not entirely surprising, however, in light of the concentration of
patent litigation in particular districts. For example, 47.4% of all patent cases in
2014 were filed in just two districts-the Eastern District of Texas (28.4%) and the
District of Delaware (18.9%).204 These districts are often selected by patentees as
preferred venues for patent litigation for a combination of reasons, including local
rules governing patent cases, judges with extensive experience in handling patent
litigation, and in some cases, a perceived bias in favor of patent holders by jurors.2 05
In particular, given that the Eastern District of Texas-and to a somewhat lesser ex-
tent, the District of Delaware-have been preferred forums for PAEs to file in-
fringement actions,20' and the difficulty that PAEs have in obtaining injunctive re-
a All Court Case Filings by Year, LEX MACHITNA, https://Iaw.Iexmachina.con/court/table#Patent-tab
(last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (reporting that 1425 patent cases were filed in the Eastern District of
Texas and 946 patent cases were filed in the District of Delaware in 2014, compared to a national
total of 5024 cases); see also Lex Machina Releases First Annual Patent Litigation Year in Review,
LEx MACEINA (May 13, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/2014/05/patent-litigation-review (listing
the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware as the top two districts for patent cases in
both 2012 and 2013); Mark Liang, The Aftermath ofTS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Pa-
tent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 41 fig.
1 (2010) (showing the most popular districts for patent litigation from 2000-2009).
205 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1486-87 (2010); Yan Ley-
chkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the East-
ern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 210-
15 (2007). For a detailed explanation of why the permissive venue rules in patent cases allow
many cases to be filed in these two districts, see Liang, supra note 204, at 39-40.
206 See Liang, supra note 204, at 42-43 tbl.1 (listing the Eastern District of Texas as the top forum for
patent infringement suits by NPEs); Fabio E. Marino & Teri H.P. Nguyen, Has Delaware Become
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lief after eBay,2 0 7 it is not shocking these two districts represent almost half of all
ongoing royalty awards.
3. Ongoing Royalty Awards: By Patented Technology
A third area of investigation was the rate of ongoing royalty awards by patent-
ed technology. Patent litigation has long varied by industry, with consumer elec-
tronics, computer software, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices among the most-
litigated fields.2
Table 3:
Ongoing Royalty Awards, by Patented Technology
Field of Technology % of Awards N
Software 37% 21
Electronics 25% 14
Medical Devices 19% 11
All Other Technologies 19% 11
As shown in Table 3, ongoing royalty awards are heavily concentrated in just
three fields-software (37%), electronics (25%), and medical devices (19%). All
other areas of technology-including mechanical, electrical, chemical, pharmaceu-
tical, and biotechnology-constitute the remaining 19% of royalty awards. Again,
however, this is not entirely surprising given that PAEs-who generally cannot ob-
tain injunctive relief, and thus can only seek monetary compensation for future in-
fringement-are heavily concentrated in the computing and software industries209
The prevalence of medical devices, however, is somewhat noteworthy, as there
are few PAEs in this field.2 0 Digging a bit deeper into the data, it appears that med-
ical device cases where an ongoing royalty was awarded fall into two subgroups: (1)
the "New" Eastern District of Texas? The Unforeseen Consequences of the AIA, 30 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. LJ. 527, 529-30 (2014) ("Recent survey data on new patent suit filings suggests that
NPE's have found a new 'forum of choice' in the District of Delaware.").
207 See supra Part II.C.
208 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERs LLP, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 12 chart 7a (2006), avail-
able at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-
study.pdf (listing consumer products as 17% of all patent cases, biotechnology and pharmaceuti-
cals as 14% of all cases, computer hardware and electronics at 10% of all cases, medical devices as
9% of all cases, and software as 7% of all cases from 1995--2013).
209 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L.
REv. 387, 413 (2014) ("We have not read anyone who seriously disputes that NPE litigation is
concentrated in business method, software, and computer technologies . . . ."); Brian J. Love, An
Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could A Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls
Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1342 (2013) ("Overall, about 65% of
NPE-asserted patents cover computer- or electronics-related inventions, and almost 40% cover the
narrower category of software-related inventions.").
210 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 209, at 418-19 n.144 (noting that "only 1% of NPE lawsuits
arise in drug or medical-technology patent classes").
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cases where the district court declined to grant an immediate permanent injunction
even though the litigants were competitors, sometimes because of concern about an
injunction's impact on the health of some members of the general public,2 1' and (2)
cases where an individual inventor or a university developed the patented technolo-
gy and thus might have difficulty proving irreparable harm.'2
4. Ongoing Royalty Awards: Operating Companies vs. PAEs
Another area of interest in the empirical data is the identity of the patentee as
an operating company or a non-practicing entity. Relying on the coding methodol-
ogy developed by Professors Chris Cotropia, Jay Kesan, and David Schwartz in
their recent study of PAE litigation,213 each patent owner was coded into one of nine
different categories.2 14 These more granular categories then were combined into
larger groups of operating companies and PAEs.M
In the data set, ongoing royalty decisions were almost evenly split between op-
erating companies (49%) and PAEs (51%). In light of the previous discussion re-
garding the unavailability of injunctive relief for PAEs,2 16 it is unremarkable that
PAEs were common recipients of ongoing royalty awards.
The number of ongoing royalties awarded to operating companies is more
noteworthy. Some operating companies turned to ongoing royalties because they
could not prove an injunction was warranted under the circumstances of the case.
For example, in Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co-, the patentee, Apple, was
unable to obtain injunctive relief against one of its top competitors, Samsung, be-
cause it was unable to demonstrate that the infringing features of Samsung's in-
211 See, e.g., Boston Sci. Corp. v. Cordis Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 259, 275 (D. Del. 2012), aff'd, 497 F.
App'x 69 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (patentee requested only an ongoing royalty because "it appreciates that
courts have been reluctant to issue injunctions in stent cases"); Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l,
Inc., No. C 03-1431 PJH, 2012 WL 761712, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012), vacated and remand-
ed, 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting an injunction but staying it for nine months while the
defendant completed a design-around and awarding an ongoing royalty during the stay period).
212 See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., No. 2:08-CV-01307, 2012 WL 1436569, at
* 1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2013); Voda v. Cordis Corp., 506 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (W.D. Okla. 2007).
213 Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities
(PAEs), 99 MwN, L. REv. 649 (2014).
214 The categories are: (1) university, (2) individual inventor, (3) large patent aggregator, (4) failed
operating or start-up company, (5) patent holding company, (6) operating company, (7) IP holding
company owned by an operating company, (8) technology development company, and (9) other.
Id. at 668-71.
215 The following categories were classified as PAEs for purposes of data analysis: (1) university, (2)
individual inventor, (3) large patent aggregator, (4) failed operating or start-up company, (5) patent
holding company, and (8) technology development company.
216 See supra Part lI.C.
236 [Vol. 23:203
Ongoing Royalties After eBay
fringing phones drove consumer demand.'7 Thus, it was awarded an ongoing roy-
alty for prospective infringement by Samsung.m2 1 '
5. Settlement of Ongoing Royalty Claims
As previously discussed, once a district court determines that an ongoing roy-
alty should be imposed, it may compel the parties to engage in negotiations regard-
ing an appropriate royalty rate." 9 However, these court-ordered negotiations usual-
ly are not successful. In the data set, only 12% of ongoing royalty awards (7 out of
57 cases) were resolved privately through the parties.22 0 The remaining 88% (50
out of 57 cases) were decided by the court.
217 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LIK, 2014 WL 7496140, at *11-15 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 27, 2014).
2m8 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Flecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LIJK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *13 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 25, 2014).
219 See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
220 These settled cases are: PACT XXP Techs., AG v. Xilinx, Nos. 2:13-CV-691, 2:07-CV-563 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 3, 2013), ECF No. 447; Medwestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10-CV-511, 2012
WL 2153165 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2012); LaserDynamics LLC v. Quanta Computer Corp., No. 2:11-
CV-276, 2:06-CV-348 (E.D. Tex. June 3, 2011), ECF No. 825; Edward Lifesciences AG v.
Corevalve, Inc., 1:08-CV-91, 2011 WL 446203 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2011); Ricoh Corp. v. Quanta
Computer Corp., No. 3:06-CV-462, 2010 WL 1607908 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010); Grantley Pa-
tent Holdings, Inc. v. Clear Channel Comm'cns, Inc., No. 9:06-CV-259 (June 10, 2008), ECF No.
244; z4 Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006). (Several of the cas-
es in the Eastern District of Texas have multiple docket numbers because the district court severed
the claim for ongoing royalties as a separate civil action.).
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6. The Structure of Ongoing Royalties
Also as previously discussed, the structure of an ongoing royalty award is an im-
portant matter.221 As depicted in Table 4 below, the predominant type of ongoing
royalty was a per-unit royalty calculated as a percentage of the infringing product's
sale price (63%). The second-most prevalent form of ongoing royalty was a per-unit
royalty based on a fixed dollar amount (31%). There were two instances of a paid-
222in-full, lump sum award that covered future infringement. In addition, there was
one ongoing royalty that was calculated as a fixed royalty price per day for the re-
maining duration of the patent-in-suit.
2 23
Table 4:
Structure of Ongoing Royalty Award
Type of Award % of Awards N
Per Unit Royalty - Percent of Sales Price 63% 30
Per Unit Royalty - Fixed Amount 31% 15
Lump Sum 4% 2
Other 2% 1
221 See supra Part III.B.3.
2m Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N, Am. Corp., 814 F. Supp. 2d 665 (N.D. Tex.
2011); Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 9:09-CV-111, 2011 WL 3269330, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
July 29, 2011).
223 Clear With Computers, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-479, 2012 WL 8144915, at
*8 (E.D, Tex. Jan. 9, 2012). In two other cases, the structure of the ongoing royalty could not be
ascertained from the public record. CardSoft, Inc. v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc. No. 2:08-CV-98,
2013 WL 5862762 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2013); Tyco Healthcare Group, LP v. Applied Med. Res.
Group, No. 9:09-CV-176 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2010), ECF No. 138.
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7. Comparison of Ongoing and Pre-Judgment Royalty Rates
Finally, one important contested issue is whether district courts hould increase
the royalty rate for future infringing uses as compared to the effective royalty for
past infringement. As previously discussed, district courts have split on this issue.2
When possible, the author attempted to obtain both the ongoing (prospective)
royalty rate as well as the effective royalty rate for past (retrospective) damages
from publicly-available court records. While this information was not always avail-
able, after diligent searching, both backward- and forward-looking royalty rates
were able to be ascertained for 74% (37 out of 50) of the ongoing royalty cases that
did not settle. From this data, the author calculated the ratio of the ongoing (post-
judgment) royalty rate compared to the pre-judgment royalty rate, expressed as a
single number.225 Thus, a ratio of 1 (representing 1:1) means that he ongoing roy-
alty rate and pre-judgment royalty rate were identical in the case. A ratio of 2 (rep-
resenting 2:1), in contrast, means that he ongoing royalty rate was double (two
times) the pre-judgment royalty rate.
Table 5 below contains summary statistics for ongoing (royalty rates compared
to pre-judgment royalty rates. In particular, the median ratio is 1.34, meaning that
in the median case, the ongoing royalty rate was 34% greater than the pre-judgment
royalty rate. The higher mean (average) ratio of 1.84 (i.e., 84% increase compared
to the pre-judgment royalty) is somewhat skewed by one outlier case. The 25th
and 75th percentiles are 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 5:






Figure 1 below illustrates the distribution of ongoing royalty rates as compared
to the pre-judgment royalty rate. As shown in the graphic, the vast majority of on-
going royalty rates are between 1-3 times the amount of the pre-judgment royalty
rate, with a peak at I (representing identical pre- and post-judgment rates) that
drops off quickly as the x-axis increases.
224 See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
225 The following formula was used: ongoing royalty rate / pre-judgment royalty rate.
226 See Boston Sci. Corp. v. Cordis Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 259, 275 (D. Del. 2012) (awarding a 32%
post-judgment ongoing royalty, compared to a pre-judgment royalty rate of 2.95% determined by
the jury).
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Figure 1:
Distribution of Ongoing vs. Pre-Judgment Royalty Rates
1 2 3 4 5 6
RATIO
7 8 9 10 11
After excluding the outlier case, the ratio of ongoing royalty rates compared to
pre-judgment royalty rates can be further evaluated. Table 6 shows the mean ratio
of royalty rates for the four districts that decide the most ongoing royalty cases, as
well as all other districts combined. The Eastern District of Texas, which awards
the most ongoing royalties, has the highest mean ratio (1.76) of all four districts.
Table 6:
Ongoing vs. Pre-Judgment Royalty Rates, by District
District Ratio Std. Error
(Mean)
Eastern District of Texas 1.76 .23
Northern District of California 1.33 .33
District of Delaware 1.58 .38
Eastern District of Virginia 1.56 .31
All Other Districts 1.57 .19
Finally, Table 7 shows the mean ratio of royalty rates based on the technologi-
cal field of the patented invention. Computer software (1.70) has the highest mean
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Table 7:
Ongoing vs. Pre-Judgment Royalty Rates, by Technology




Medical Devices 1.46 .16
All Other Technologies 2.08 .51
V. A Methodology for Calculating Ongoing Royalties
In this final Part, this Article proposes a new methodology for calculating an
ongoing royalty. Specifically, it contends that the decision maker should start with
the royalty rate for retrospective (past) damages. This royalty rate can then be ad-
justed upward or downward based on the presence of a variety of factors, including
the market for the patented invention, anticipated non-infringing alternatives to the
invention, and other considerations. Finally, it contends that enhancement of the
ongoing royalty rate for "willful" infringement is generally inappropriate.
A. Proposed Formula
The following formula expresses the author's proposed methodology for de-
termining an ongoing royalty rate:
Ro=(R+Fi-Fd) *E
Ro represents the ongoing royalty rate. Rj stands for the royalty rate for past
infringement, which is the starting point of the analysis. The next two factors, F and
Fd, embody factors that favor an increase or decrease of the ongoing royalty rate,
respectively, compared to the royalty for past infringement. Finally, E represents
the possibility of an enhancement of the ongoing royalty rate separate from the oth-
er factors. Each of these variables is discussed in more detail below.
B. Using the Prejudgment Royalty Rate as a Starting Point
In general, "the jury's [retrospective] damages award is a starting point for
evaluating ongoing royalties."227 This verdict "is not dispositive[,] but only a start-
ing point in the analysis.,,2 21
Some contend that retrospective and prospective royalty determinations are
substantially different, and thus the prospective royalty rate should be determined
227 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-CV-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 6687122, at *t4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 25, 2014).
228 1/P Engine, Inc. v AOL, Inc., No. 2:1 1cv512, 2014 WL 309245, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2014).
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largely independently of the rate for past infringement.229 This misapprehends the
relationship between the two forms of royalties. Both royalties attempt to determine
the value that the parties place on the ability to use the patented technology and the
amount they would be willing to pay (for the licensee) and accept (for the licensor)
at certain points in time-for retrospective damages, shortly before the time of first
infringement; and for prospective royalties, at the time of final judgment. These de-
terminations both rely on similar evidence, including the nature of the patented
technology, the identity of the litigants, and the infringing products.
C. Factors Affecting an Ongoing Royalty Rate
Once the retrospective damages award is selected as the starting point, the de-
cision maker then should consider evidence of actual or anticipated changes to
technological and market conditions that may affect the post-judgment licensing
rate. This is a natural part of the hypothetical negotiation process. As Professor
John Golden has explained, "private parties presumably set royalty rates with a
view to some estimate of future market conditions. .. [i]f the parties anticipate
changed market conditions, they can . .. agree to a formula or process for adjusting
the royalty rate accordingly."2 30 Similarly, Professor Peter Lee has noted that the
value of a patented invention "may change over time, rendering the reasonable roy-
alty for past infringement an imperfect measure of compensation for prospective in-
fringement."231 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has expressly approved the considera-
tion of post-verdict evidence, stating that district courts "may take additional
evidence if necessary to account for additional economic factors arising out of the
imposition of an ongoing royalty." 2 32
Some scholars have contended that the ongoing royalty rate should generally
be the same as the royalty rate for past infringement.2 33  For instance, Professor
Mark Lemley has contended that "the answer to how to set the ongoing royalty
seems straightforward: it is the royalty rate the jury set for past damages."234 How-
229 See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[P]re-suit and
post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct . . . .") (Rader, C.J., concurring).
230 Golden, supra note 77, at 2150 n. 142
231 Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REv, 175, 234
(2011).
232 Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315; see also id. at 1316-17 (Rader, C.J., concurring) (asserting that "post-
judgment acts of infringement ... may warrant different royalty rates given the change the parties'
legal relationship and other factors." (emphasis added)); ActiveVideo v. Verizon, 694 F.3d 1312,
1343 (Fed Cir. 2012) (noting that "an assessment of prospective damages for ongoing infringe-
ment" may consider "changes in the parties' bargaining positions and other economic circumstanc-
es that may be of value in determining an appropriate ongoing royalty").
233 See COTTER, supra note 8, at 127 (asserting that "if there is some class of cases in which policy
post-eBay dictates that courts award prospective royalties in lieu of a permanent injunction, they
should use the same, ex ante, licens[ing] terms used in setting retrospective royalties").
234 Lemley, supra note 112, at 702. Professor Lemley later notes a potential exception: when there is
"proof of circumstances going forward that differ from those the jury considered in setting past
damages." Id. at 706-07.
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ever, limiting an ongoing royalty to the jury's determination of a retrospective roy-
alty rate risks potential over- or under-compensation of the patentee by failing to
consider post-verdict evidence that might affect the parties' valuations-and thus
their willingness to license-the patented technology.
Some factors-represented in the formula by variable Fr-might counsel in fa-
vor of an increased ongoing royalty rate. For example, if the patented technology
has increased (or is expected to increase) in value due to changing market condi-
tions, this might counsel in favor of a higher prospective royalty rate. This occurred
after remand in Paice v. Toyota, where the district court concluded that the patent-
ee's hybrid vehicle technology increased in utility due to changing market forces-
namely, skyrocketing oil and gas prices-as well as changes to the regulatory envi-
ronment (federal fuel efficiency standards) that made the patented technology more
valuable? Ultimately, these considerations led the district court to grant an ongo-
ing royalty that was nearly four times larger than the retrospective royalty rate.3
Another potential reason to increase the ongoing royalty rate is when the patented
technology has matured and become more widely implemented in products and ser-
vices that have obtained market acceptance.m
Other factors, in contrast, might weigh in favor of a decreased royalty rate.
These are represented in the formula by variable Fd. One such factor is the potential
availability and market acceptance of subsequently-developed non-infringing alter-
natives to the patented technology. If a non-infringing alternative would provide
the same benefits as the patented technology-or even be superior to it-then it
would reduce the licensee's willingness to pay a future royalty." Similarly, the
likelihood and anticipated expense of creating a "design around" that avoids the pa-
tented technology would be relevant in setting an ongoing royalty.23 9 Furthermore,
the demand for the patented technology may change to due to other reasons, such as
exogenous market forces or changes in consumer preferences.
235 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 628-29 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
236 Id. at 630 (granting an ongoing royalty of $98 per infringing vehicle sold, compared to a $25 per
vehicle royalty for past infringement).
237 See Ullmer, supra note 3, at 96 (noting that "the value for past-infringement of e-commerce pa-
tents during the early days of the Internet would [be] substantially less valuable than . . . the same
patents after immense e-commerce markets emerged"),
238 Tzenova, supra note 138; see also COTTER, supra note 8, at 67 ("From an economic perspective,
the overarching consideration is the benefit the user would expect to gain from the use, in compari-
son with alternatives , . , ."),
239 See Ullmer, supra note 3, at 96 ("The elusive 'other factors' that Rader refers to in his Paice con-
currence should include considerations such as whether the infringer can easily design around the
patent and use noninfringing alternatives. . . ."); see also Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM Co., 584
F. Supp. 2d 916, 919 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that "some factors such as the relative importance
of the technology or the availability of a design-around may have changed since the date of first in-
fringement").
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D. Enhancement of the Ongoing Royalty Rate
The final variable in the formula, E, is perhaps the most controversial-it rep-
resents an enhancement (increase) in the ongoing royalty rate for reasons other than
technological and market changes, most commonly due to alleged willful infringe-
ment,2 40 As previously discussed, many district courts conclude that any post-
judgment uses of the patented technology by the adjudicated infringer are automati-
cally willful. 24 ' As a result, these courts generally treat the royalty rate for past
damages as a floor below which an ongoing royalty will not fall, 24 2 and often grant
increased damages to deter the defendant from future infringement.24 3
This reasoning is flawed. Enhancement should not automatically occur simply
because an adjudicated infringer continues infringing after an ongoing royalty is
awarded. Enhanced amages are imposed "to deter willful patent infringement by
punishing the willful infringer." 244 But an ongoing royalty expressly authorizes fu-
ture uses of the patented technology that would otherwise be infringing in exchange
for a royalty payment. Thus, "wilifulness, as such, is not the inquiry when the in-
fringement is permitted" by a court-ordered royalty.245 As Professor Lemley has
explained, "[i]f a court has decided that he defendant should be allowed to continue
to sell the infringing product because enjoining its sale imposes too great a hardship
on either the defendant or the public, it seems odd to then punish the defendant for
doing the very thing the court just permitted."24 6
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that an ongoing royalty is typically
awarded only when a patentee requests it. The patentee can elect to not pursue a
240 See, e.g., Affinity Labs ofTex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 (E.D. Tex. 2011)
(after "calculat[ing] the amount of a reasonable ongoing royalty ... [tihe court may then determine
whether, and by how much, this reasonable 'market' royalty should be increased to account for the
fact that ongoing infringement will be willful").
241 See, eg., id. at 899 ("Following a jury verdict and entry ofjudgment of infringement and no inva-
lidity, a defendant's continued infringement will be willful absent very unusual circumstances.");
Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc., No. 6:07-CV-511, 2010 WL 8231079, at *16 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 11, 2010) ("[Defendant] is now an adjudged infringer and [Defendant's] continued infringe-
ment is both voluntary and intentional, making [Defendant's] continued infringement willful.");
see also Janicke, supra note 87, at 186 ("[Pjost-verdict acts of willfulness would appear to be ipso
facto present in light of a final judgment in the patent owner's favor.").
242 See, e.g., Boston Sci. Corp. v. Cordis Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 259, 276 (D. Del. 2012), afd, 497 F.
App'x 69 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("The court declines to allow Cordis, an adjudicated willful infringer, to
effectively owe less for its post-verdict infringement than the jury found for its pre-verdict in-
fringement under the circumstances.").
243 See, e.g., VimetX, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:13-CV-211, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2014)
(applying Read factors and increasing ongoing royalty rate by 50% due to defendant's willful in-
fringement).
244 Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also NTP
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 270 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("Enhanced damages
not only operate as a punitive measure against individual infringing defendants, but they also serve
an overarching purpose as a deterrence of patent infringement.").
245 Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
246 Lemley, supra note 112, at 702.
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prospective remedy and preserve its right to bring a second lawsuit for damages ac-
crued after judgment in the initial action, often with a strong claim for willful-
ness.24 7 It would be anomalous for a patentee to seek an ongoing royalty from the
infringer for future uses of the patented technology on one hand and then later,
when that royalty award is being determined, claim the infringer's future uses are
now improper and thus deserving of enhancement.
Although willfulness is not a sound justification for enhancing an ongoing roy-
alty award, there may be other reasons that district courts should consider a poten-
tial enhancement in the prospective royalty rate. One such reason may be to ensure
adequate compensation to the patentee for future infringement.248 As previously
noted, in a negotiation for an ongoing royalty, one of the major incentives for an in-
fringer to agree to a license-the "big stick" of a permanent injunction249-has been
removed.2 50 Thus, "[w]ithout the risk of a post-judgment enhancement, a defendant
would be encouraged to bitterly contest every claim of patent infringement, because
in the end, only a reasonable royalty would be imposed and there would essentially
be no downside to losing." 2 5  At the same time, however, district courts should be
wary of excessively large enhancements, such as greater than triple the amount of
the royalty rate for past damages. Large enhancements can effectively act as a
property rule by making use of patented technology unaffordable, and thus the de-
fendant will not practice the technology despite the ongoing royalty expressly per-
mitting it to do so.252
VI. Conclusion
Ongoing royalties have become an increasingly important form of prospective
relief for prevailing patentees since the Supreme Court's landmark CBay decision.
In particular, given PAEs' difficulty in establishing irreparable harm and the ab-
sence of an adequate remedy at law following eBay, it may be the only available
form of relief available for future infringement short of repeated lawsuits for ac-
crued damages. However, ongoing royalties are not limited to PAEs; some operat-
ing companies, particularly those in the medical device industry, have relied on this
form of equitable relief as well.
Despite their growing importance, lower federal courts have not settled on a
consistent, economically sound methodology for determining an appropriate ongo-
4 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 13, at 1663 ("A
subsequent suit might strengthen the possibility of a willful-damages award, if the plaintiff could
not previously make one out....").
248 See, e.g., Univ, of Pittsburgh v. Varian Med. Sys., Inc., No. 08cv1307, 2012 WL 1436569, at *11
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2012) ("The ongoing royalty must adequately compensate he patentee for the
continued infringement . . , .").
249 Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 624 (ED. Tex. 2009).
250 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
251 Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. BMW N. Am., 783 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
252 See Keller, supra note 139, at 428 ("When the royalty rate gets high enough it acts as an effective
injunction by making continued infringement unprofitable.").
2015] 245
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw JOURNAL
ing royalty rate. This Article offers a potential framework for doing so. It relies on
the retrospective (prejudgment) royalty rate as a starting point, but also requires that
the decision maker consider evidence regarding actual and anticipated market con-
ditions, emerging non-infringing alternatives to the patented technology, and other
factors that may influence the future value of the patent. Finally, while it contends
that enhancement of the ongoing royalty rate due to the alleged "willful" nature of
post-judgment infringement is inappropriate, it also recognizes that a modest in-
crease in the royalty rate may be needed to fully compensate the patent holder for
loss of its right to exclude the infringing defendant in the future.
Appendix
List of Ongoing Royalty Decisions Since eBay
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT COURT DOCKET CITE DATE
Douglas Dynam- Buyers Prods. W.D. Wis. 3:09-CV- 2014 WL 12/31/14
ics, LLC Co. 00261 7409503
Apple, Inc. Samsung Elecs,, N.D. Cal. 1:12-CV- 2014 WL 11/25/14
Inc. 00630 6687122
TransPerfect MotionPoint N.D. Cal. 4:10-CV- 2014 WL 11/13/14
Global, Inc. Corp. 02590 6068384
Bianco Globus Med., E.D. Tex. 2:12-CV- 2014 WL 7/2/14
Inc. 00147 2980740
Telcordia Cisco Sys., Inc. D. Del, 1:04-CV- 2014 WL 4/14/14
Techs., Inc. 00876 1457797
Carnegie Mellon Marvell Tech. W.D. Pa. 2:09-CV- 2014 WL 3/31/14
Univ. Grp., Ltd. 00290 1320154
Depuy Synthes Globus Med., D. Del. 1:11 -CV- ECF No. 3/28/14
Prods., LLC Inc. 00652 415
VirnctX Inc. Apple Inc. E.D. Tex. 6:13-CV- ECF No. 3/6/14
00211 6:10- 53; 925 F.
CV-00417 Supp.2d
816
WBIP, LLC Kohler Co. D. Mass. 1:11 -CV- 2014 WL 2/12/14
10374 585854
I/P Engine, Inc. AOL, Inc. E.D. Va. 2:11-CV- 2014 WL 1/28/14
00512 309245
Tomita Techs. Nintendo Co., S.D. N.Y. 1:11-CV- 2013 WL 11/12/13
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CardSoft, Inc. VeriFone Hold- E.D. Tex, 2:08-CV- 2013 WL 10/30/13
ings, Inc. 00098 2:13- 5862762
CV-00941
Morpho Detec- Smith Detec- E.D. Va. 2:11-CV- 2013 WL 10/17/14
tion, Inc. tion, Inc. 00498 5701522 1
PACT XPP Xilinx E.D. Tex. 2:13-CV- ECF No. 9/3/13
Techs., AG 00691 2:07- 447
CV-00563
Internet Machs. Alienware Corp. E.D. Tex. 6:10-CV- 2013 WL 6/19/13
LLC 00023 4056282
Syntrix Biosys- Illumina, Inc. W.D. 3:10-CV- 2013 WL 6/18/13
tems, Inc. Wash. 05870 3089448
Warsaw Ortho- Nuvasive, Inc. S.D. Cal. 3:08-CV- ECF No. 6/10/13
pedic, Inc. 01512 592
Univ. of Pitts- Varian Med. W.D. Pa. 2:08-CV- 2012 WL 4/25/13
burgh Sys. 01307 1436569
Fractus, S.A. Samsung Elecs., E.D. Tex. 6:12-CV- 2013 WL 3/15/13
Inc. 00421 6:09- 1136964
CV-00203
Soverain Soft- J.C. Penney E.D. Tex. 6:09-CV- 899 F. 8/9/12
ware LLC Corp. 00274 Supp. 2d
574
Meadwestvaco Rexam PLC E.D. Va. 1:10-CV- 2012 WL 6/12/12
Corp. 00511 2153165
Broadcom Corp. Emulex Corp. C.D. Cal. 8:09-CV- ECF No. 3/16/12
01058 1090
Boston Sci. Cordis Corp. D. Del. 1:10-CV- 838 F. 3/12/12
Corp. 00315 Supp.2d
259
Fresenius USA, Baxter Int'l, Inc. N.D. Cal. 4:03-CV- 2012 WL 3/8/12
Inc. 01431 761712
Clear With Hyundai Motor E.D. Tex. 6:09-CV- 2012 WL 1/9/12
Computers, LLC Am., Inc. 00479 8144915
ActiveVideo Verizon E.D. Va. 2:10-CV- 827 F. 11/23/11
Networks, Inc. Cornm'cns, Inc. 00248 Supp. 2d
641
Mondis Tech. Chimei Innolux E.D. Tex. 2:11 -CV- 822 F, 9/30/11
Ltd. Corp. 00378 Supp. 2d
639
Lighting Ballast Philips Elecs. N. N.D. Tex. 7:09-CV- 814 F. 8/26/11
Control, LLC Am. Corp. 00029 Supp. 2d
1 1_ 665
Datatreasury Wells Fargo & E.D. Tex, 2:06-CV- 2011 WL 8/2/11
Corp. Co. 1 00072 8810604
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Personal Audio, Apple, Inc. E.D. Tex. 9:09-CV- 2011 WL 7/29/11
Inc. 00111 3269330
LaserDynamics Quanta Com- E.D. Tex. 2:1 1-CV- ECF No. 6/3/11
LLC puter, Inc. 00276 2:06- 825
CV-00348
Edwards Corevalve, Inc. D. Del. 1:08-CV- 2011 WL 2/7/11
Lifesciences AG 00091 446203
Affinity Labs of BMW N. Am., E.D. Tex. 9:08-CV- 783 F. 1/26/11
Texas LLC LLC 00164 Supp. 2d
891
Bard Peripheral W.L. Gore & D. Ariz. 2:03-CV- ECF No. 9/9/10
Vascular Assocs., Inc. 00597 1057
Soverain Soft- Newegg, Inc. E.D. Tex. 6:07-CV- 836 F. 8/11/10
ware LLC 00511 Supp.2d
462
Presidio Com- Amer. Tech. S.D. Cal. 3:08-CV- 2010 WL 8/5/10




Tyco Healthcare Applied Med. E.D. Tex. 9:09-CV- ECF No. 5/17/10
Group LP Res. Grp. 00176 138
Humanscale CompX Int'l E.D. Va. 3:09-CV- 2010 WL 4/29/10
Corp. Inc. 00086 1779963
Ricoh Co. Quanta Com- W.D. Wis. 3:06-CV- 2010 WL 4/19/10
puter Inc. 00462 1607908
Transamerica Lincoln Nat'l N.D. Iowa 1:06-CV- 691 F. 3/8/10
Life Ins. Co. Life Ins. Co. 00110 Supp. 2d
946
Creative Internet Yahoo Inc. E.D. Tex. 6:07-CV- 674 F. 12/9/09
Adver. Corp. 00354 Supp.2d
847
Cummins- SBM Co., Ltd. E.D. Tex. 9:07-CV- 669 F. 11/13/09








Ongoing Royalties After eBay
Boston Sci. Johnson & N.C. Cal. 3:02-CV- 2009 WL 4/9/09






Joyal Prods., Inc. Johnson Elec. D. N.J. 3:04-CV- 2009 WL 2/27/09
N. Am., Inc. 05172 512156
Hynix Semicon- Rambus Inc. N.D. Cal. 5:00-CV- 609 F. 2/23/09
ductor, Inc. 20905 Supp.2d
951





Amado Microsoft Corp. C.D. Cal. 8:03-CV- 2008 WL 12/4/08
00242 8641264
Grantley Patent Clear Channel E.D. Tex. 9:06-CV- ECF No. 6/10/08
Holdings, Inc. Commc'n, Inc. 00259 244
Orion IP, LLC Mercedes-Benz E.D. Tex. 6:05-CV- 2008 WL 3/28/08
USA 00322 8856865
ResQNet.com, Lansa, Inc. S.D.N.Y. 1:01-CV- ECF No. 2/1/08
Inc. 03578 219
Broadcom Corp. Qualcomnm, Inc. C.D. Cal. 8:05-CV- ECF No. 12/31/07
00467 995
Voda Cordis Corp. W.D. 5:03-CV- 2006 WL 3/27/07
Okla. 01512 2570614
Genlyte Thomas Arch. Lighting D. Mass. 1:05-CV- ECF No. 2/5/07
Group LLC Grp. 10945 80
Innogenetics, Abbott Labs. W.D. Wis. 3:05-CV- ECF No. 9/11/06
N.V. 00575 357, 360
Finisar Corp. DirecTV Group E.D. Tex. 1:05-CV- 512 F.3d 7/7/06
Inc. 100264 1363
z4 Microsoft Corp. E.D. Tex. 6:06-CV- 434 F. 6/14/06
00258 6:06- Supp. 2d
CV-00 142 437
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